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SUMMARY 
 
 
Research goals 
 
This document provides the final research report and concomitant findings for Work-Package 
Deliverable 10, ‘Detailed Overview of the Findings of this Work Package for the Use in 
Subsequent Project Phases’, Workpackage 2: ‘Supranational Level Studies’ (EXLINEA 
Project Proposal and Technical Annex to the contract, 2001). The report is meant to 
complement individual case studies of emergent cross-border regime dynamics situated at the 
future eastern borders of the European Union, providing an overview of the perceptions, 
policies and practices undergirding the proposed governance of this frontier by key EU 
institutions. 
 
The specific research goal of the supranational level studies has been defined as: ‘to 
characterise the supranational contexts conditioning cross-border co-operation patterns and 
processes in the case study regions’ (EXLINEA Project Proposal and Technical Annex to the 
contract, 2001). This entails uncovering the geopolitical significance of the case study areas in 
terms of EU discourse and specific policies and strategies affecting the respective regions 
including mechanisms put in place to manage EU programmes. As such, the constitution of 
the EU’s policies towards its external borders in different phases of enlargement will be 
investigated. The formation of major EU policies with impacts on border areas is analysed as 
a process conditioned by the following factors: 
  
• as principles defined in the basic EU documents (Single European Act, Maastricht treaty, 
etc.) and in the particular documents and initiatives regarding borders and transnational 
development (e.g. Schengen Treaty, European Spatial Development Perspective, 
INTERREG); 
• as specific applications of these principles during different phases of enlargement; 
• as geopolitical strategies of the EU and nation states (e.g. Northern Dimension, EU 
Common Strategies); 
• as resulting from continuities and changes in national border policies prevailing before a 
certain border became an EU external border.  
 
 
Research methodology 
 
The overall research process has been characterised by three stages; (1) data collection, (2) 
data analysis and (3) elaboration of the research report. The data collection stage specifically 
concentrated on those documents produced by EU policymaking institutions actively involved 
in the field(s) of border regimes, cross-border co-operation and migration/security issues. 
These institutions include the Directorates General for ‘Enlargement’, ‘Regional Policy’, 
‘Internal Market’ and ‘Justice & Home Affairs’ within the European Commission, as well as 
the European Council and the European Parliament. The documented sources include, 
amongst others, basic EU-principles, Commission communications and proposals, political 
statements, press material and reports of debates. In addition to the collection of written 
source material, various interview sessions were held with representatives of relevant EU 
policy-making institutions. Data thus collected was analysed by means of text and discourse 
analysis. In order to situate the elaboration of the Supranational Level Studies within a wider 
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analytical frame, the report includes the latest academic insights on the openness versus 
closure of the EU border regime.  
 
In the Theoretical Framework, developed for EXLINEA at the beginning of the project 
period, two over-arching and interrelated ‘meta-themes’ were defined from this literature. 
These meta-themes, divided into sub-themes, were the following: 
 
1) What/where is the European Union: 
• Drawing Eastern EU-borders: who’s in and who’s out? 
• What model is the European Union? 
2) Openness and closure of the external border 
• Cross-border political networking 
• Migration, border control and citizenship 
 
During the writing of the report, our explicit goal has been to elaborate the results of the 
empirical research for the Supranational Level Studies under the respective headings of these 
meta- and sub-themes, as developed in the Theoretical Framework. 
 
 
Research findings 
 
The first meta-theme is directed at drawing the Eastern EU-borders and the model the 
European Union takes on. Agreement at the supranational level seems to be lacking with 
regard to the factors that should determine whether a state does, or does not, comply with a 
certain degree of ‘Europeanness’ to be granted access into the Union. As established at the 
1993 European Council of Copenhagen, accession criteria are based on principles of ‘own 
merits’, ‘differentiation’ and ‘catching up’. These very notions, of course, are unclear and 
arbitrary, open to multiple interpretations.  
 
In 2003, the European Commission released the ‘Wider Europe Communication’, introducing 
the concept of ‘Neighbourhood’, meant to express the EU’s desire to establish friendly, stable 
relations with its immediate eastern neighbours Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. In the 
Communication, the Commission refers to these four nations as ‘good neighbours’, thereby 
underlining their exclusionary position in the EU enlargement process. The countries on the 
Western Balkans, on the other hand, are explicitly given the prospect of future EU-
membership. Current candidate countries Romania and Bulgaria await accession in 2007, 
albeit recent turmoil over non-compliance with regard to human rights criteria and persistent 
corruption might be a cause of delay in this respect. EU-accession of the third candidate 
member country, Turkey, remains highly controversial. 
 
Diverging interests and straight-forward geopolitics appear to play an important role in the 
EU’s eastern enlargement. As a result of the divergent positions of Russia and the EU with 
regard to the Western Newly Independent States, the zone from the Black Sea to the Baltic 
Sea is currently characterised by geopolitical tensions which diminishes the likelihood that the 
EU will make attempts in the near future to start genuine membership negotiations with 
countries of this zone. The goal of the EU in regard to the Northern Dimension is to enhance 
economical and political co-operation with countries in this region, both with EU and non-EU 
member-states. 
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At the southern external border, finally, the European Commission has a clear view of the 
opportunities for these neighbours to become member states. In the Wider Europe 
Communication, the commission writes: ‘accession has been ruled out, for example, for the 
non-European Mediterranean partners’. Apparently, the notion of ‘Europeanness’ is first of all 
fed by geographical criteria and only secondly by official accession criteria in the fields of 
democracy, human rights or market reforms.  
 
The Supranational Level Studies have revealed a particular absence of interest in regard to the 
issue of what model fully captures the essence of what the EU is. No official Commission 
documentation exists to date explicitly addressing the question of what form of state the EU, 
once a political union, is or should take on. We oppose for the largest part the assumptions of 
the modernisation theory on the reconstruction of the ‘nation of Europe’. We suggest that an 
‘empire metaphor’, which points to the centredness of sovereignty, captures best the manner 
in which EU enlargement is unfolding. Within an imperial system, sovereignty is not in the 
hands of one single state, nor can we speak of sovereign equality. Instead, we may speak of 
diffuse patterns of centres with power fading off at its peripheries. This metaphor allows one 
to think beyond state-like bordering processes. Difference in such a Post-Westphalian solution 
should also be acknowledged in developing a model of state for the future enlarged European 
Union. 
 
The second meta-theme focuses on the consequences of the (re-)bordering practices for 
nurturing transnational and transboundary bordering and opportunity structures across 
Europe’s future external borders. The creation of Euroregions (or Euregions), cross-border 
associations of local government, has been particularly favoured in CEECs. These 
associations represent an additional tier of regional ‘administration’ and play a vital role in 
channelling INTERREG and PHARE cross-border co-operation funds into border regions; it 
is their responsibility to develop cross-border regional development programmes that, having 
received approval by senior governments and the EU, serve as operational plans for the 
disbursement of project grants. 
 
DG Enlargement is currently developing a New Neighbourhood Instrument, destined to 
implement the Commission’s New Neighbourhood Policy as laid down in the Wider Europe 
Communication. The Instrument will introduce into the scope of cross-border co-operation 
additional, wider geopolitical objectives which will become increasingly important after 
enlargement. These geopolitical objectives range from fighting transnational crime and 
terrorism to nourishing local cultural ties across the external border. As from 2006, the New 
Neighbourhood Instrument is to replace all existing programmes, including, apart from 
INTERREG and PHARE CBC, Tacis, CARDS and Meda. From 2004 until 2006, so-called 
Neighbourhood Programmes will be introduced as an intermediate step in this convergence 
process of current cross-border funding schemes.  
 
De-bordering processes in and by the EU appear to go hand in hand with re-bordering 
processes. A  great number of Commission documentation concerns the closing of the border 
for residents of third-country nationals. Illegal migration is the issue which, according to our 
document sources, especially requires an intensified co-ordination among the present and new 
member states. The second half of 2003 indeed witnessed a whole range of proposals released 
by DG Justice and Home Affairs, addressing the development of a common policy on illegal 
immigration, human trafficking and the management of external borders towards this purpose. 
The documents again reveal a dominant rhetoric in favour of ‘returning illegal residents’. To 
this end, the Commission has proposed the establishment of a European Agency for the 
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Management of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders. The Commission also 
introduces the concept of ‘leverage’: co-operating third countries might be rewarded with 
compensatory measures. However, with respect to the actions of third countries, it would be 
unfortunate and ultimately counterproductive if the handling of the issue of undocumented 
migration were to be used as a quid pro quo for future development aid, as currently 
considered. 
 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The authors consider it significant that none of the EU officials interviewed for this study 
ventured to make statements about the territorial entity the European Union will have or 
should be having after enlargement. Given that an underlying cartographic bias appears to 
guide much of the Commission’s thinking regarding the direction and sequencing of 
enlargement (in the sense of a progressively eastward ‘domino theory’ of expansion), the 
absence of a ‘vision’ for the new European polity-in-the-making should raise concerns that at 
the heart of the Commission functionalist economic criteria may be gaining the upper hand in 
visualising Europe’s future territorial identity, to the detriment of issues germane to the 
continent’s democratic development. It does not service to the inhabitants of the EU’s future 
external border regions to have such debates cloistered behind ivy walls and out of earshot of 
the policy-makers in Brussels.  
 
As the record of cross-border economic and political networking examined in this study 
indicates much more remains to be done to ensure that a ‘fortress’ like boundary is attenuated 
in favour of more ‘fluid’ and open transboundary governance structures. In reconciling the 
imperatives of Schengen and those of heightened transboundary institution-building across 
the future borders of Europe, closer co-ordination between the Commission’s Directorate 
General of Justice and Home Affairs and that of its Directorate General of Regional Policy is 
surely warranted. With regard to the latter, the New Neighbourhood Instrument certainly is a 
step in this direction, as it confronts the need to more adequately harmonise the various 
funding schemes between member and non-member states, notably INTERREG and PHARE 
CBC.  
 
From the evidence, it would appear that the goal of an effective and coherent border regime 
targeting legal as well as illegal migrants remains contingent on the resolution of an existing 
ambiguity in the separation of powers within DG Justice and Home Affairs.  At the very least, 
it would be expected that the allocation of competencies between the first (Communautarian) 
and third (Justice and Home Affairs) pillars of DG JHA be clarified in favour of the former 
pillar, if only to provide supranational consistency to Europe’s future border migration regime 
in lieu of ad hoc nationally-oriented approaches in dealing with migration issues. 
 
From the foregoing it may be corroborated that, as regards governance of its future external 
boundary, the European Union has no univocal ‘essence’. This insight should not serve as a 
pretext, however, for the Commission to absolve itself from ‘grand narratives’ regarding its 
newly expanded boundary. In this context it would be imprudent if Europe’s approach to the 
cross-border regions straddling non-member states were left to be determined by the external 
vagaries of ideology or history alone. 
 
 
 
 V 
CONTENTS 
 
 
SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................ I 
 
CONTENTS ..............................................................................................................................................V 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND CONTEXT TO THE SUPRANATIONAL LEVEL STUDIES............1 
 
2 RESEARCH GOALS.........................................................................................................................3 
 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .........................................................................................................4 
3.1 General overview.........................................................................................................4 
3.2 Supranational level studies .........................................................................................5 
3.2.1 Data collection..............................................................................................................5 
3.2.2 Data analysis ................................................................................................................5 
3.2.3 Writing of the report......................................................................................................6 
 
4 WHAT/WHERE IS THE EUROPEAN UNION? RESEARCH FINDINGS..............................................6 
4.1 Drawing Eastern EU-borders: who’s in and who’s out? ...........................................7 
4.1.1 Candidate member countries .........................................................................................7 
4.1.2 The Wider Europe Initiative ..........................................................................................8 
4.1.3 The Western Balkans .....................................................................................................9 
4.1.4  The Northern Dimension ............................................................................................10 
4.1.5 ‘Island areas’ ..............................................................................................................11 
4.2 What model is the European Union?........................................................................11 
4.2.1 The EU as a Super-State?............................................................................................12 
4.2.2 The ‘empire’ metaphor ................................................................................................12 
4.2.3 Towards a post-Westphalian solution? ........................................................................13 
 
5 OPENNESS AND CLOSURE OF THE EXTERNAL BORDER: RESEARCH FINDINGS........................14 
5.1 Cross-border political networking............................................................................15 
5.1.1 Transferring cross-border institution-building.............................................................16 
5.1.2 Compatibility of funding schemes: towards a New Neighbourhood Instrument ............16 
5.1.3 Cross-border governance capacities............................................................................18 
5.2 Migration, border control and citizenship ...............................................................18 
5.2.1 Transferring migration issues to the supranational level .............................................19 
5.2.2 Bordering undocumented immigrants ..........................................................................20 
5.2.3 Local border traffic .....................................................................................................22 
 
6 CONCLUSION: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................23 
 
 
REFERENCES .........................................................................................................................................26 
 
ANNEX I: INTERVIEW REQUEST LETTER .............................................................................................34 
 
ANNEX II: SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE.................................................................................37 
 
ANNEX III: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES ....................................................................................................39 
 
 1 
1 INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND CONTEXT TO THE SUPRANATIONAL LEVEL 
STUDIES 
 
This document provides the final research report and concomitant findings for Work-Package 
Deliverable 10, ‘Detailed Overview of the Findings of this Work Package for the Use in 
Subsequent Project Phases’, Workpackage 2: ‘Supranational Level Studies’ (EXLINEA 
Project Proposal and Technical Annex to the contract, 2001). The report is meant to 
complement individual case studies of emergent cross-border ‘regime’1 dynamics situated at 
the future eastern borders of the European Union, providing an overview of the perceptions, 
policies and practices undergirding the proposed governance of this frontier by key EU 
institutions. Part II outlines the primary research goals of the study. Part III delineates 
elements of the core research methodology utilized during the course of the study. Part IV and 
V elaborate on the research findings emerging as a result of field-work conducted by team 
members. A concluding section rounds out the report. 
 
The study begins with the premise that the future external border of the European Union is 
still - as former EU Commission President Jacques Delors was fond of calling the European 
integration project at the beginning of the 1990s - an ‘unidentified political object’. The 
making of a United European place has thus far been accommodated with image-making 
concepts such as European Internal Market, European Union, Single Market, Borderless 
Europe, Eu(ro)regions, Euro, Europe of the Regions, Economic and Monetary Union. Based 
on an idea of economic equality and solidarity among the member states and regions, funding 
programmes have been set up to effectuate these imaginary notions of spatial unification 
focussing in particular on the enhancement of cross-border harmonisation, cohesion and 
development. The success of European territorial policy is seen to depend on solid 
partnerships, close co-operation and solidarity among the richer and poorer member-states of 
the European Union. In this context, the impact of EU enlargement on its future external 
borders remains ‘unidentified’, however, because its future geographical demarcation, 
political efficacy and cultural identity are still highly contested and open to doubt. 
 
Occurring presently not always under historical conditions of its own choosing, the project of 
European enlargement is certainly not the first such expansion to have occurred since the 
Treaty of Rome was signed nearly half a century ago, but it is the most ambitious by any 
measure. The Enlargement process received a particularly decisive boost from the EU’s 
Copenhagen summits of 2002 - so much so that the notion of an accelerated ‘big bang’ 
accession was then making the rounds. But the expansion of the EU to the East and Southeast, 
while undoubtedly creating new contexts and opportunities, is also generating potentially new 
problems for societal, and hence, local and regional cross-border interaction. Aside from the 
sheer magnitude of the task, we suggest the historical novelty of the current round of 
enlargement, due May 1 2004, involves nothing less than aggregating to the Union of Europe 
those countries formerly belonging to that alternative ‘dreamworld’ of capitalist modernity 
represented by the ex-Soviet sphere of influence (Buck-Morss, 2000). It is as a consequence 
of that profound and far reaching de-differentiation of global spheres of influence represented 
by the demise of the historically freighted East/West bipolarity, and the concomitant 
integration of formerly socialist and post-colonial island regimes into a Western-oriented 
planetary sphere of influence, that we may grasp the anxious stakes of the current conjuncture 
                                                          
1
 A ‘border regime’ in this context refers to the full range of policy instruments used by the European Union in 
the governing of its external borders, encompassing effects and consequences which cannot be located 
exclusively at the physical border proper but may extend to national capitals and their respective hinterlands (for 
further elaboration, see Zielonka, 2001). 
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represented by the re-siting of the European Union’s external boundaries to the edges of the 
Russian landmass and into the heart of the Mediterranean.   
 
In the face of the resulting geopolitical power vacuum wrought since the tumultuous changes 
of 1989-1990, the countries of Central and Eastern European (hereafter CEECs) have been 
attempting to establish closer political and economic ties to the European Union and other 
institutions of European integration. These overtures were taken seriously. The EU clearly 
affirmed that strategic rationales mandated a streamlined process of accession (Verheugen 
2000). Eight former socialist countries2, as well as Cyprus and Malta, were deemed in theory 
to be ready for membership by 2004, while ‘timetables’ were to be established for other 
countries (such as Romania and Bulgaria) not considered as far developed in negotiations 
with the EU. Furthermore, even though Russian membership is not at issue, the EU has also 
emphasised its support for a meaningful political partnership and a ‘positive, broad and 
ambitious economic agenda’ with the Russian Federation.3 Similarly, the ‘Northern 
Dimension’ initiative, representing an explicitly geopolitical perspective on enlargement, aims 
at influencing the enlargement process in order to promote ‘positive interdependence’ 
between the Baltic Sea Area, the EU, and Russia (Lipponen 1999:4; Scott, 2004). 
 
While enlargement presents a major challenge for the European Union4, it will have even 
more far-reaching effects both on acceding CEECs and neighbouring countries that, either in 
the short or long-term, will remain outside the EU. Regarding the former, these societies face 
fundamental economic, institutional and social changes. Economic restructuring, while often 
necessary, continues to polarise post-socialist nations and creates hardship for large segments 
of their domestic populations. Physical infrastructure must be modernised and expanded. 
Functioning civil societies and open parliamentary democracies are in the process of 
consolidation. Enlargement transforms the significance of borders between CEECs 
themselves as well as between the EU and neighbouring states. The re-establishment of state 
borders within the former Soviet Union as well as regionalisation trends in CEECs and 
Russia, have increased the number of actors taking part in European political affairs (Herd 
2001). The new actors include not only states and international organisations but also local 
governments and communities, each of them with their own perceptions of security needs and 
threats. 
 
In the context of the foregoing, it should come as no surprise that the EU’s present and future 
external borders mark rather dramatic differences in socio-economic, political and structural 
development. The border contexts we have purported to analyse through the lens of central 
EU institutions are peripheries in many senses of the word - generally distant from more 
dynamic urban centres and regions. But they are also highly asymmetric. Diverse socio-
economic conditions and practices ‘confront’ each other in Central, Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe, opening prospects for trade and co-operation but at the same time encouraging illegal 
and other undesirable activities or creating new tensions. In addition, different cultures come 
                                                          
2
 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
3
 Quoted from a letter written by Pascal Lamy, EU Trade Commissioner, and Chris Patten, EU External Affairs 
Commissioner, to the Financial Times (17 December 2001). Furthermore, the EU has pursued a ‘Common 
Strategy’, agreed to by the European Council (June 1999), in order to develop a comprehensive political 
partnership with the Russian Federation. This is evidenced, among other things, by EU support of Russian 
accession to the World Trade Organization, a move which signals a desire to positively influence institutional 
reform in that country. 
4
 See, in particular, the Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion in the European Union (European 
Commission 2001a). This document goes into some detail about the socio-economic and structural imbalances 
that enlargement will introduce and addresses the need to minimise polarising tendencies. 
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into close contact in very concrete situations, often resulting in difficulties in mutual 
understanding and communication. Importantly, past contested sovereignties and present 
ethnicity and minority rights issues loom large in almost all of these regions, complicating 
interstate relationships. We thus confront issues of Russian (and ex-Soviet) nationals in 
Estonia, Ukraine and Moldova; ethnic Hungarians in Romania and the Ukraine; Romanians in 
Hungary; and the complex regional situation in the Balkan Peninsula such as Greek-
Macedonian border regions or the tri-national (Greek-Bulgarian-Turkish) region of Thrace. In 
this light, the potential effects of exclusionary policies with regard to future ‘non-EU’ states, 
perhaps resulting in a ‘Fortress Europe’ mentality, could have considerable negative impacts 
on the future political and economic stability of these areas. 
 
With the rapid assimilation of Baltic, Eastern European and Mediterranean countries into 
Western Europe’s security perimeter, European expansion has been accompanied by 
numerous additional fears to replace those tied to the Cold War anxieties of nuclear 
annihilation, emotions that are now being projected and condensed on the future external 
border of the EU itself. In this context, Europe’s future external border is predominantly 
envisioned as a thin outer line of marked-off territory, vulnerable to penetration, violation and 
abuse, and thus requiring heavy and sustained investment in defence, surveillance and 
protection. Representations of the new EU border are thus actively serving to consolidate a 
future model of European space defined primarily by the existing territoriality of European 
nation-states.   
 
 
 
2 RESEARCH GOALS  
 
With regard to the foregoing and in accordance with the overall research objectives of 
EXLINEA as laid down in the EXLINEA Project Proposal and the Theoretical Framework, 
the specific research goal of the supranational level studies has been defined as: 
 
‘to characterise the supranational contexts conditioning cross-border co-operation 
patterns and processes in the case study regions’. This entails uncovering the geopolitical 
significance of the case study areas in terms of EU discourse and specific policies and 
strategies affecting the respective regions including mechanisms put in place to manage 
EU programmes. As such, the constitution of the EU’s policies towards its external 
borders in different phases of enlargement will be investigated. The formation of major 
EU policies with impacts on border areas is analysed as a process conditioned by the 
following factors: 
  
• as principles defined in the basic EU documents (Single European Act, Maastricht 
treaty, etc.) and in the particular documents and initiatives regarding borders and 
transnational development (e.g. Schengen treaty, European Spatial Development 
Perspective, INTERREG); 
• as specific applications of these principles during different phases of enlargement; 
• as geopolitical strategies of the EU and nation states (e.g. Northern Dimension, EU 
Common Strategies); 
• as resulting from continuities and changes in national border policies prevailing 
before a certain border became an EU external border.  
 
(EXLINEA Project Proposal and Technical Annex to the contract, 2001, p. 14) 
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As such, the research report at hand corresponds to deliverable number 10, ‘Detailed 
overview of the findings of this work package for the use in subsequent project phases’ under 
workpackage 2, ‘Supranational Level Studies’ (EXLINEA Project Proposal and Technical 
Annex to the contract, 2001). The following section discusses a number of methodological 
considerations which have been taken into account during the elaboration of the empirical 
fieldwork and the subsequent writing of the research report. 
 
 
 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 General overview 
 
The current section presents a short recollection of the overall methodological guidelines to 
EXLINEA. A detailed discussion of the methodological background to the empirical 
fieldwork can be found in the EXLINEA Project Proposal, the Theoretical Framework and the 
Empirical Framework, written by the various EXLINEA project partners. The following table 
summarises the general research methodology employed: 
 
Table 1: Overview of general research methodology 
Level of Analysis 
 
A 
Policies 
B 
Perceptions 
C 
Practices 
1 Supranational  
(Work package 2) 
 
 
 
 
Legal frameworks; 
Directives; institutions; 
Programmes and  
Policies and strategies 
developed at the EU and at 
bi- and multilateral levels 
targeted at the 
countries/regions under 
scrutiny 
EU geopolitical and geo-
economic discourse 
regarding the strategic 
significance of the regions; 
statements and debates 
regarding enlargement and 
free movement of 
labour/people 
 
Quality of relations 
between EU and involved 
countries; transnational 
state and non-state actors’ 
activities with regard to the 
regions (where applicable: 
EU, UN, COR, Council of 
Europe, NGOs); 
(In)compatible funding 
arrangements 
2 National 
(Work package  
4-9) 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal frameworks; 
Directives; Institutions; 
Policies affecting or 
specifically addressing the 
border regions; Migration, 
border control and 
citizenship policies; 
Prevailing border regime(s) 
Europeanising discourse 
and strategies; 
‘Nationalising’ discourses 
and strategies; Prevailing 
perceptions of the border 
regions and their strategic 
significance; National 
discourse on migration, 
border control and 
citizenship 
 
National activities in the 
region related to cross-
border interaction; 
Constellation of national 
actors involved; Co-
operation strategies and 
initiatives; (In)compatible 
funding arrangements 
3 Local/Regional 
(Work package  
4-9) 
 
 
 
 
 
Local policies and formal 
institutions (regional 
associations); Prevailing 
border regime 
 
Europeanising discourse 
and strategies; 
‘Nationalising’ discourses 
and strategies; Prevailing 
perceptions of the border 
regions and their strategic 
significance; Perceptions 
of security/safety at the 
border 
Regional and local actor 
constellations (public 
agencies, civil society, 
economic agents); Co-
operation strategies and 
initiatives; (In)compatible 
funding arrangements 
Source: EXLINEA Project Proposal and Technical Annex to the contract, 2001, p. 27. 
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3.2 Supranational level studies 
 
The overall research process has been characterised by three stages; (1) data collection, (2) 
data analysis and (3) elaboration of the research report. It is important to note that a 
traditional, successive-linear approach has not been used in this respect. Instead, due to the 
timeliness of the research topic at hand, the various data sources – official EU-documentation, 
interview proceedings, media coverage and academic publications – were constantly 
triangulated and updated, also during the writing of the report. For reasons of feasibility 
however, the three stages are here described and explained in a successive order: 
 
3.2.1 Data collection 
 
The data collection stage first started with the creation of an extensive EXLINEA archive of 
written documentation. A great many text sources exist on the issue of EU-enlargement and 
its external border regime, varying from the reflection of public opinion in the media to policy 
documents of institutions at different government levels. The collection of this literature 
specifically concentrated on those documents produced by EU policymaking institutions 
actively involved in the field(s) of border regimes, cross-border co-operation and 
migration/security issues. These institutions include the Directorates General for 
‘Enlargement’, ‘Regional Policy’, ‘Internal Market’ and ‘Justice & Home Affairs’ within the 
European Commission, as well as the Council of the European Union and the European 
Parliament. The documented sources include, amongst others, basic EU-principles, 
Commission communications and proposals, political statements, press material and reports 
of debates. The EXLINEA archive has been complemented with relevant press material and 
academic publications, and is continuously updated.  
 
In addition to the collection of written source material, various interview sessions were held 
with representatives of relevant EU policy-making institutions. The introductory letter that 
was sent to potential respondents is enclosed in Annex I. Representatives of the following 
organisations have been contacted: 
 
• the European Commission’s Directorate General of Enlargement; 
• the European Commission’s Directorate General of Justice and Home Affairs; 
• the European Commission’s Directorate General of Regional Policy; 
• the European Parliament. 
 
Respondents were asked to reflect on the perceived contradiction between the openness and 
closure of the external border regime of an enlarging European Union. The interviews were 
guided by a semi-structured questionnaire, specifying the overall research issue (openness 
versus closure of border regimes) into various questions and sub-questions. The questionnaire 
is enclosed in Annex II. A detailed list of institutions, departments and representatives can be 
found in Annex III. Finally, it is important to note here that, as a consequence of the 
sensitivity of the research topic, none of the respondents would agree to have their interview 
recorded on tape. 
 
3.2.2 Data analysis  
 
Data thus collected was analysed by means of text and discourse analysis. In this respect, the 
analysis of written documentation in the EXLINEA archive allowed for both text and 
discourse analysis, in the sense that it entails factual as well as contextual information 
required to provide answers to the research questions formulated above. The interviews cast 
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light primarily on the ways in which EU-policymaking with regard to the issues of 
enlargement and Europe’s external border regime is contextually embedded within wider EU-
policy debates as well as in prevailing institutional structures. Upon request of the 
interviewees, no literal transcriptions of comments were incorporated into the report. Rather, 
the interview proceedings were used to subscribe and illustrate the results forthcoming in the 
document analysis.  
 
3.2.3 Writing of the report 
 
In order to situate the elaboration of the Supranational Level Studies within a wider analytical 
frame, the report includes the latest academic insights on the openness versus closure of the 
EU border regime. Due to the timeliness of the research issue, a considerable number of 
academic researchers in the fields of human geography, political science, sociology and 
economics is actively involved in ‘researching’ the re-bordering of the European Union. Since 
many of them are also making use of combined document and interview analysis techniques, 
we found this stream of literature highly valuable for the elaboration of the Supranational 
Level Studies. In the Theoretical Framework, developed for EXLINEA at the beginning of the 
project period, we defined two over-arching and interrelated ‘meta-themes’ from this 
literature (Van Houtum, Kramsch and Pijpers, 2003). These meta-themes, divided into sub-
themes, were the following: 
 
3) What/where is the European Union: 
• Drawing Eastern EU-borders: who’s in and who’s out? 
• What model is the European Union? 
4) Openness and closure of the external border 
• Cross-border political networking 
• Migration, border control and citizenship 
 
During the writing of the report, our explicit goal has been to elaborate the results of the 
empirical research for the Supranational Level Studies under the respective headings of these 
meta- and sub-themes, as developed in the Theoretical Framework. 
 
 
 
4 WHAT/WHERE IS THE EUROPEAN UNION? RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
The first meta-theme is directed at the practices, policies and perceptions of (re)bordering the 
European Union. What are the past, present and future bordering and ordering spatial  
routines and practices at the new borders of the enlarged European Union? The member states 
of the European Union have appropriated a great deal of space by territorialising the exclusive 
membership of their club. The recently approved enlargement involves, geopolitically 
speaking, a new reality for understanding what is the territory of the European Union today. 
The creation of an ‘organised’ European space that is cohesive, competitive, coherent and 
sustainable is a political and social project of considerable ambition. Given the long-standing 
concern among academics and EU policy-makers regarding the proper democratic basis of 
such an enlarged policy, it is no coincidence that the European Union has embarked on 
parallel policies that promote a sense of European identity and citizenship (Anderson, 2002). 
It is believed that without a multilevel and boundary-transcending ‘connectedness’ between 
cities, regions, states and EU institutions, the concept of the EU as a space of meaning (and 
not a merely functional economic organisation) will remain distant to the majority of its 
citizens (Laidi, 1998; Shore, 2000; Scott, 2002). It is equally acknowledged, however, that the 
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institutionalisation of an European territorial identity carries with it the risk of generating 
problematic new exclusions which in turn harbor the potential to undermine the democratic 
basis of the EU itself (Paasi, 1996; Balibar, 2003).  Focusing on this theme, the following 
issues have been distilled from current academic and political debates: 
 
 
4.1 Drawing Eastern EU-borders: who’s in and who’s out? 
 
The question of who will, and who will not belong to the European Union as it stretches 
eastward will be at the core of upcoming political and academic debates on enlargement. This 
is the problem of ‘sequencing’: enlargement is likely to proceed in stages and it’s a truism   
that: ‘nobody knows exactly which countries will actually get in and in what order’ (Zielonka, 
2001). Agreement seems to be lacking with regard to the factors that should determine 
whether a state does, or does not, comply with a certain degree of ‘Europeanness’ to be 
granted access into the Union. As established at the 1993 European Council of Copenhagen, 
accession criteria are based on principles of ‘own merits’, ‘differentiation’ and ‘catching up’ 
(Enlargement Website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index, Burawoy, 1992). These 
very notions, of course, are unclear and arbitrary, opening themselves to multiple 
interpretations.  
 
4.1.1 Candidate member countries 
 
In the case of the candidate member countries Romania and Bulgaria, a final decision on 
accession has not yet been taken. When asked the question of when Romania would be ready 
for EU-membership, our respondent from DG Enlargement’s Romania unit merely pointed to 
the Commission’s official target year: 2007. The European Council of Thessaloniki (2003) 
concluded positively that ‘Bulgaria and Rumania are part of the same inclusive and 
irrevocable enlargement-process’. Confining itself to the strict monitoring of the Copenhagen 
criteria, the European Commission supports both Bulgaria and Romania’s efforts to finish 
membership-negotiations in 2004 (CEC, COM 2003/676). Both countries could indeed 
become full-swing member states in 2007, but this still depends on their attempts to fight 
disrespect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. With regard to the actual progress of 
Romania thus far achieved, a telling difference of opinion has recently emerged between the 
Commission and the European Parliament, which, having the final say in regard to the 
accession-issue, seems to be much more critical on these matters. In a particularly harsh 
report on Romania’s progress towards accession, Parliament heavily criticises the ever still 
difficult position of (Roma) minorities in the country, the limited freedom of the press, and 
the widespread corruption (EP, 2004/A5-0103). A recent uproar over the ill-practice of 
Romania allowing the continued adoption of Romanian children abroad has further induced 
Parliament to stay alert regarding the country’s future membership (EP, 2004/A5-0103) 
 
Parliament holds a similar critical opinion with regard to Turkey, the third candidate member 
country. The case of Turkey is considered to be problematic by many, including the European 
Commission (CEC, COM 2003/676). Some argue that based on religious grounds, the country 
cannot be regarded as European. In their view, the Judeo-Christian roots of Europe must not 
be ignored and the EU should strive for integration congruent with the frontiers of (medieval) 
Christian civilisation. In that case, Turkey provides the EU with a constitutive outside, 
through the notion of the Islamic ‘Other’ in defining it’s identity and future. However, some 
observers emphasise that Turkey’s historical importance for contemporary Europe, notably 
the city of Istanbul, offers proof of Europeanness as such. A decision on accession in this 
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respect thus strongly depends on the images by which the EU represents its territory. A 
European Union underlining its Christian heritage can use this image as a ground of exclusion 
when it comes to determining whether Turkey should become a member or not. The preamble 
of the European Convention’s Draft Treaty establishing a European Constitution states:  
 
‘…Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanistic inheritance of Europe, 
the values of which, still present in its heritage, have embedded within the life of society 
the central role of the human person and his or her inviolable and inalienable rights, and 
respect for law…’ (European Convention, 2003)  
 
Such a representation of EU-space does not a priori seem to rule out Turkey. However, the 
Treaty on a EU-Constitution has not been accepted by all member states (yet). Uncertainty in 
this respect remains. Our interviews with representatives from the Enlargement Directorate 
General once more reinforced the observation that Turkey’s potential EU-membership is 
highly controversial indeed. As stated by our informants, Turkey was only granted candidate 
country status ‘for symbolic reasons’ (Interview with DG Enlargement, 7-5-2003). In this 
respect, the current and timely developments on Cyprus might have important implications for 
accession negotiations with Turkey. The discussion of Turkey’s EU-membership, in short, 
remains one of the pitfalls of European integration. A settlement of the Cyprus dispute before 
May 1st, 2004 might prove to be a breakthrough in this respect. 
 
4.1.2 The Wider Europe Initiative 
 
In 2003, the European Commission released two communications which shed light on the 
perceptions and practices guiding EU policy-making in defining the parameters of EU 
membership.  The first of these, entitled the ‘Wider Europe Communication’, has received 
far-reaching attention in academic circles. This communication introduces the concept of 
‘neighbourhood’, meant to express the EU’s desire to establish friendly, stable relations with 
its immediate eastern neighbours, candidate and Balkan countries excluded5 (CEC, COM 
2003/104). In order to contribute to political stability, economic development and the 
reduction of poverty and social inequality within this so-called ‘Ring of Friends’, as the 
document explicitly names these neighbouring states, the EU is to promote regional co-
operation and integration. Towards this end, the whole range of relevant EU-policy 
mechanisms should be made available. The communication affirms that the Wider Europe 
initiative is independent of the issue of EU-membership, although ‘further EU expansion 
awaits a debate on the ultimate geographic limits of the Union’. This is because: 
 
The aim of the New Neighbourhood Policy is … to provide a framework for the 
development of a new relationship which would not, in the medium-term, include a 
perspective of membership or a role in the Union’s institutions. A response to the 
practical issues posed by proximity and neighbourhood should be seen as separate from 
the question of EU accession (CEC, COM 2003/104, p. 5). 
 
Academic literature provides no clear-cut interpretation of this aim. Some argue that, reading 
between the lines, referring to Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova as ‘good neighbours’ 
implicitly implies that they will nevertheless remain outsiders to the EU, as many still regard 
Russia as Europe’s cultural ‘Other’ (Xenakis and Chryssochoou, 2001; Maresceau and 
Lannon, 2001). By this account, certain distinctive stereotypes and historical myths are 
reinvented in order to define the Other and to construct a European identity in opposition to 
                                                          
5
 Namely Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. 
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Russia, defined as a cultural Other in a broader, civilizational sense. Similar constructions to 
define an identity against Europe/EU seem to be operative in Russia, too (Tunander, 1997). 
These attributed ‘folk devils’ are linked to an alleged unfamiliarity with democracy and 
human rights stemming from Russia’s (different) cultural background. To be sure, such 
narratives are absent from European Commission communications on the EU’s eastern 
neighbours.   
 
EU enlargement is not comprised entirely of narratives and discourses, however. Diverging 
interests and straight-forward geopolitics seem to play a role in EU’s eastern enlargement as 
well. According to Kolossov (1998) Russia’s new political elites assert that they inherited the 
status of a great power from the Soviet-Union and that as a consequence Russia should 
broaden its sphere of influence to a larger area around its borders. In light of this image, the 
Western Newly Independent States are regarded by Russia as its ‘near abroad’, thereby 
showcasing a Russian version of the Monroe Doctrine (Baev, 1997). Despite having regained 
their sovereignty in the 1990’s, Belarus, Ukraine (meaning ‘borderland’ in Slavonic) and 
Moldova, for instance, are industrially and economically still dependent on Russia. Political 
elites in these states have openly turned towards Russia. Russia has adopted the attitude of a 
central power with a sphere of influence that incorporates among others Belarus, Ukraine and 
Moldova (Tunander, 1997). However, since the end of the 1990’s Russia’s resources and 
capabilities to act as a Great Power have shrunk dramatically and there has been a 
concomitant strengthening of the regions of the former USSR (Baev, 1997).  
 
As a result of the divergent positions of Russia and the EU with regard to these countries, the 
zone from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea is currently characterised by geopolitical tensions, 
following almost exactly the medieval divide between the Eastern Orthodox and the Western 
Roman Catholic Church. Into the distant future, predictions about further EU eastern 
enlargement are therefore difficult to discern. For the time being, in Russian geopolitical 
discourse the Western Newly Independent States are still represented as belonging to their 
sphere of influence and, although Russia has lost geopolitical power, it is still able to exert 
control over its Near Abroad. The EU seems to acknowledge this implicitly, which diminishes 
the likelihood that the EU will make attempts in the near future to start genuine membership 
negotiations with countries of this zone.  
 
At the southern external border, the European Commission has a clearer view of the 
opportunities for these neighbours to become member-states. In the Wider Europe 
Communication, the commission writes: ‘accession has been ruled out, for example, for the 
non-European Mediterranean partners’ (CEC, COM 2003/104, p. 5). Apparently, the notion 
of ‘Europeanness’ is first of all fed by geographical criteria and only secondly by official 
accession criteria in the fields of democracy, human rights or market reforms. The empirical 
research in Brussels revealed a reluctance on the part of interlocutors to engage in the debate 
on the EU’s ultimate limits. One of the respondents even remarked that the European 
Commission does not engage in ‘doing blue sky-thinking’ (Interview with DG Enlargement, 
7-5-2003). 
 
4.1.3 The Western Balkans 
 
The second communication, entitled ‘The Western Balkans and European Integration’ 
contains prospects for the eventual accession of the Balkan countries6 into the European 
                                                          
6
 Namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia 
and Montenegro. 
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Union (CEC, COM 2003/285). In the document, in which they are explicitly named ‘potential 
candidates for EU membership’, the European Union obliges itself to strive for this desire to 
become reality:  
 
The preparation of the countries of the Western Balkans for future integration into 
European structures is a major priority of the European Union. These countries should 
have a clear perspective of joining the European Union when they have satisfied all the 
necessary criteria (CEC, COM 2003/285, p. 7). 
 
Interestingly, this statement again illustrates the a-priori application of geographical rather 
than political and socio-economic criteria when discussing possible EU-membership of a 
country or group of countries. Based on developments with regard to the establishment of a 
well-functioning juridical system or the creation of a market economy, for instance, there 
seems to exist no obvious reason why Albania should be given a better prospect on EU-
membership than Moldova, as is presently the case. The Wider Europe communication states 
that Moldova does not currently possess the competitive strength or administrative capacity to 
take on the reciprocal obligations of a Free Trade Agreement (CEC, COM 2003/104, p. 11), 
but the same might count for Albania too. Although both the Wider Europe and the Balkan 
communications strive for a deeper integration of the respective countries into the Union’s 
policymaking, the states of the Western Balkans are foreseen to eventually become actively 
involved in Community programmes. A telling example of this is the RTD Sixth Framework 
Programme, which will possibly be extended to the Balkan states in order to ‘help familiarise 
the countries with Community policies and working methods and contribute to preparing 
them for a closer relationship with the Union’ (CEC, COM 2003/285, p. 5). The ‘Ring of 
Friends’ states, on the contrary, are not promised such concrete participation. Rather, the EU 
wishes to ‘integrate the scientific communities of the neighbouring countries’ through the 
establishment of a so-called European Research Area (CEC, COM 2003/104, p. 13). 
 
4.1.4  The Northern Dimension 
 
A key geo-political concept in the external and cross-border policies of the European Union is 
the Northern Dimension, which stretches from north-west Russia via the Baltic Sea coastal 
area’s to the Norwegian Sea and Iceland. The goal of the EU is to enhance economical and 
political co-operation with countries in this region, both with EU and non-EU member-states.  
Iceland and Norway, non EU-member states, are more or less tied up to the EU within this 
framework. Co-operation (in the form of free-trade) between EU and EFTA-countries in 
general obviously adds to that too.  
 
The Northern Dimension Action Plan (2000) is quite revealing in regard to the EU-attitude 
towards co-operation with Russia. According to this Action Plan, Russia’s business 
environment lacks stability, predictability and incentives for Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SME). Further, Russia’s trade and investment legislation would suffer from inadequate 
clarity and transparency and the EU strives for aligning Russian standards with its own. At the 
same time, a TEMPUS project for north-west Russia has been created, trade and tourist 
activity is growing fast and the EU has helped Russia with accession to the World Trade 
Organisation. The attitude of the EU towards Russia is therefore rather ambivalent; on one 
hand it tries to enhance co-operation with Russia within different European and international 
frameworks, and on the other hand it attempts to keep Russia out and is ‘battling’ over their 
mutual ‘Near Abroads’. 
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4.1.5 ‘Island areas’ 
 
A final note on the question of who’s in and who’s out concerns the position of Kaliningrad 
and other ‘island areas’. Particularly of importance to the former case are the measures taken 
with regard to the movement of Russian citizens to and from Kaliningrad, which will become 
a Russian enclave in the European Union. In its ‘Kaliningrad: Transit’ Communication of 
September 2002, the European Commission has specified a number of regulations in this 
respect, which were successfully negotiated with Russia in November of that same year 
(CEC, COM 2002/520). Agreement has been reached on the issuance of a special visa for 
Russian citizens who are officially listed as ‘regular’ travellers between Kaliningrad and 
Russia. As of 2005, Russian citizens will be required to be in possession of an international 
passport in order to get onto this list. 
 
The logic of the internal market program sheds more light on the question of what order 
countries actually can accede to the EU. Internal market strategy is at the core of EU policy- 
making. Since the European Commission’s White Paper on the internal market (European 
Commission, 1985) at various stages internal EU-borders have become less and less 
significant, at least as an obstruction to the flows of capital, people, services and goods. A 
state that is not located at the current external border of the EU is unlikely to become a future 
member, as it would contravene a vision of the European Union as essentially borderless for 
capital, goods and labour.  According to this logic of ‘sequencing’, Georgia could not become 
a member of the EU before Turkey or the Ukraine.  
 
Foreseeable administrative problems regarding the implementation of the Schengen acquis in 
case of such an enlargement further point to the undesirable side effects of letting in a state  
that is not at the current EU external border. In such an instance, the EU would be dependent 
on the willingness of non-EU states in allowing for the transit of people through non-EU. A 
visa-free travel regime between the EU and a potential new member-State that is not at the 
current EU-border is therefore highly unlikely. Reciprocity would be difficult to establish, as 
visa-free travel from most non-EU members to the EU is prohibited (Common List, Annex 1, 
Council Regulation No. 539/2001). The difficulties stemming from the flow of people 
between Kaliningrad and Russia, which is in a sense the opposite situation of the picture 
painted here, point to the fact that the EU will be reluctant to let in a state that does not border 
the current EU-territory. 
 
 
4.2 What model is the European Union? 
 
The question arises to what extent the current practice of re-bordering the European Union is 
in fact an outcome of the assumptions of modernization theory, whereby the European Union 
is visualized as a state that attempts to reconstruct the nation of Europe. Such a vision is 
nourished by a combination of cartographic myths and gut-feelings of what Europe is. Here, 
project members conjecture to what extent alternative bordering regime models can be 
devised that avoid the simplistic and exclusionary state-like bordering of the enlarged 
European Union.  
 
The Supranational Level Studies, that is, both the document and the interview analysis, have 
revealed a particular absence of interest in this topic. No official Commission documentation 
exists to date explicitly addressing the question of what form of state the EU, once a political 
union, is or should take on. According to officials working in the Enlargement Directorate 
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General, issues of such a reflexive nature surpass the immediate concerns of the Commission 
as a policy executive institution. This form of policy-making betrays an incremental, ad-hoc 
attitude in shaping the EU. Indeed, the issue of what model the European Union should have 
or appears to have in practice, seems to be primarily taken up by academic researchers 
(Hellström, 2003, Hudson, 2000, Christiansen et al. 2000, Zielonka, 2001).  
 
4.2.1 The EU as a Super-State? 
 
It is not clear where the (ultimate) borders of the EU lie. This is also not the case if we look at 
the different fields of policy-making. Countries within the European Union can use their right 
for an opt-out of a certain area of policy-making, as is the case with the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark in regard to the Schengen-aquis. Some states from outside the EU have an opt-in for 
different forms of policies (Christiansen and Jorgensen, 2000). Since the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997), states can use the institutions of the EU in order to accelerate integration 
in certain areas. These developments make it increasingly difficult to regard the EU as a 
super-state. 
 
Further, the different nation-states are still reluctant to give up their sovereignty in a lot of 
areas of policy-making. Despite the growth of the first (Communautarian) pillar, some 
important competencies remain in the second (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and 
third (Justice and Home Affairs) pillars. This reflects the ongoing ‘game’ that exists between 
the EU and the member-states in defining who is sovereign in which area. According to 
Hudson (2000), the EU represents a highly elaborated example of a multi-level governance 
system (cf. Marks and Hooghe, 2001). The different nation-states in the EU are still important 
and powerful actors, yet at the same time the EU as a supranational power-structure has 
gained (decision-making) power, making it an important political actor in its own right in 
Europe. In addition, the regions have been able to strengthen their role in and by the EU, for 
example in the Committee of the Regions and can pass over the various states in certain areas 
of administration.  
 
If the EU resembles a super-state, one would expect that Europeans will first and foremost 
identify with this spatial construct. A EU-identity would then have to be stronger than the 
different national identities that exist in Europe. Murphy (1999), however, argues that a 
European or EU-identity will not replace the different national identities. Most Europeans do 
not see the EU as a super-state, with an analogue identity attached to it, but they are willing to 
accept it as a meaningful social-territorial construct. A constellation of different spatial 
identities in the EU will arise. This line of reasoning opposes for the largest part the  
assumptions of the modernisation theory on the reconstruction of the ‘nation of Europe’. Such 
an additional EU-identity will, however, be crucial for further integration. Without a EU-
identity next to national and other spatial identities, based on the cultural diversity of Europe, 
the process of Europeanisation will inevitably slow down or even halt (Van Ham, 2001). 
 
4.2.2 The ‘empire’ metaphor 
 
A metaphor stemming from the Middle Ages has become rather popular in recent 
commentary on post-Cold War developments in Europe. As the EU-integration process 
accelerated, in particular after the Treaty establishing the European Union (the ‘Maastricht 
Treaty’), the proper nature of the territoriality of sovereignty within this new constellation 
became increasingly unclear (Waever, 1997). This state resembles in part that of the Middle 
Ages, characterized by multiple and fluid overlays of sovereignty, power and authority 
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(Anderson, 1996). Moreover, the borders of the EU following the next enlargement will be 
congruent with the medieval dividing line between the Roman-Catholic Church and the 
Orthodox Church. Therefore, in a sense, the medieval metaphor is generative of a powerful 
spatial imaginary capturing a quite fundamental aspect of what the European Union is 
becoming. According to some, it might be that a ‘neo-medieval’ rather than post-Westphalian 
solution is best suited to the current post-modern and post-Soviet environment of 
contemporary Europe (c.f. Zielonka, 2001). However, by means of this metaphor, the 
European Union is represented as more or less similar to the Holy Roman Empire. Such a 
non-worldly, non-secular entity can hardly be compared with the European Union of our 
present times. Democracy and human rights, an essential part of EU-policy, were not 
guaranteed in medieval times. The (neo)medieval metaphor, though it may be intuitively 
persuasive, fails to fully grasp a model of the European Union-in-the-making.  
 
Waever (1997) uses a different historical metaphor to describe current developments in 
relation to the European Union. He states that the EU resembles something like an ancient 
Mesopotamian empire. Other writers have compared the EU with the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire (Farago, 1995) and the Roman Empire (Brague, 1993; Mourier, 1993). This empire 
metaphor points to the centeredness of sovereignty. Within an imperial system, sovereignty is 
not in the hands of one single state, nor can we speak of sovereign equality. Instead, we may 
speak of diffuse patterns of centres with power fading off at its peripheries. European politics 
and integration are currently unfolding around one centre: Brussels. The other empire on the 
Eurasian peninsula is of course Russia (with Moscow as its centre) and another European 
empire might conceivably emerge in the form of Turkey, with Ankara as its centre (Waever, 
1997). However, the latter could be ‘incorporated’ into the EU by means of accession. The 
empire metaphor, with its emphasis on centres and concentric circles, makes it easier to see 
why countries like Belarus and Ukraine are not so much outside the EU, but rather inside the 
outer Russian circle. In some places the grey zones will be conflicting, but empires do not rub 
against each other in the same way nation-states do. In contrast to nation-states and 
ideological blocs, adjoining empires can have blurred and under-energized borders where they 
both fade out (Waever, 1997). 
 
4.2.3 Towards a post-Westphalian solution? 
 
However, despite a burgeoning literature suggesting the neo-colonial or post-colonial 
pretensions undergirding the entire EU enlargement project (Brooks and Kovacs, 2001; 
Kramsch, 2002; Hansen, 2002, 2004; Engel di Mauro, forthcoming), to bluntly speak of the 
European Union as an empire would be rather misleading. Brussels (in co-operation with 
Strasbourg and Luxembourg) may provide accommodation for the major EU-institutions, but 
one obviously cannot speak of Brussels as a centre that dominates or even conquers in 
concentric circles surrounding states, regions or nations in order to create an empire. The EU 
consists of several (nation-) states that have voluntarily joined this supranational structure. As 
far as there are differences in decision-making power between different states or regions, this 
has hardly anything to do with distance from the supposed centre of Brussels. Centrality, 
distance and territory in the EU do not have the same meaning they had in (ancient) empires. 
 
The EU, after all, is a construction made (up) by several (nation-) states. The European Union 
comes forth out of the Westphalian state (-system) and still functions within a world state-
system. Therefore, it can not be totally different from it. Although decision-making power 
relations between national governments, regions and the supranational structure have altered 
radically in a manner best captured by the multi-level governance model, it is states that can 
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become members of the EU, not regions or people. The EU will not be a super-state either; 
different nation-states still retain much decision-making power. The most accurate description 
for what model the EU is, would then be to see it as a Post-Westphalian construction, in 
which some medieval and ancient characteristics resonate. 
 
The importance of these medieval and ancient principles lies not so much in what they reveal 
about the essence of what (model) the European Union might be, but far more in providing 
lessons in regard to the issues of governance and openness versus closure of the external 
border (see notably Walters, forthcoming). The Forward Studies Unit of the European 
Commission has, in collaboration with the European University Institute, taken up the task of 
placing the Union’s external border regime in a broader post-Soviet European and global 
context. The result of this study was published in April 1999 under the title ‘The Long-Term 
Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border’. The report, focusing on 
diversity rather than unity, called for broader support of the idea of ‘difference’ in European 
governance. Difference should also be acknowledged in developing a model of state for the 
future enlarged European Union. More recent publications with a focus on long-term 
developments place the discussion of the EU’s external border regime in a post 9/11 context 
of shifting priorities from the openness of borders to that of closure (Centre for European 
Policy Studies, 2002; Van Houtum and Van Naerssen, 2002). 
 
 
 
5 OPENNESS AND CLOSURE OF THE EXTERNAL BORDER: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
The second meta-theme focuses on the consequences of the (re-)bordering practices for 
nurturing trans-national and trans-boundary bordering and opportunity structures across 
Europe’s future external borders. Both the practices and consequences of specific border 
regimes have important feedback effects on the nature and direction of the European Union 
project as a whole. When it concerns the trans-boundary structures of border regimes in the 
European Union, a key element is the degree of mobility they in turn enable. Enlargement 
brings about new economic opportunities for both the new countries as well as for the current 
member-states. After the eastward shift of the external EU-border, flows of people, goods and 
capital might take on new forms, directions and volumes. Ideas, information, capital and 
labour can ideally flow more easily across previously closed borders. Yet mobility is desired 
and feared at the same time. For, inside the current European ‘club’, citizens of the member 
states are encouraged to network and wander around freely in order to increase comfort for 
all, but at the new outer borders, the entrance gates of the enlarged club are and will be 
strongly patrolled and guarded (Van Houtum, 2002). The enlargement of the European Union 
will bring along huge investments securing and tightening the outer borders of the European 
Union (Kennard, 2002; Brown, 2002).  
 
In describing from what parts a border-regime is constructed, Langer (1999) makes a useful 
distinction between the openness of the border versus its permeability. Permeability refers to 
the degree in which the border is a (physical) barrier or obstruction for people who attempt to 
cross it. Openness is related to the degree in which at the border, juridical and administrative 
obstructions are thrown up; ‘openness refers to the level of expenses needed to cross the 
border at official border crossings’ (Langer, 1999, p. 32). Permeability refers to the ability of 
a border to prevent illegal crossings, both at and next to the official checkpoints. The degree 
of openness is related to administrative determinants and permeability is shaped by technical 
installations. 
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In the European Union, impermeability of the external border is still striven for, a wish that is 
evidenced by the huge investments that are and will be spent on fortification in the near 
future. On the other hand, several attempts regarding the enhancing of economical and 
cultural ties between the EU and Wider Europe, c.q. the ‘Ring of Friends’ point to a 
fundamental change in discourses on openness of the external borders. This turn opens up a 
field on new possibilities for shaping both the EU itself, as well as its external borders.  
 
Openness and permeability are separate features of the border, yet at the same time they can 
influence each other in many ways. Rising the degree of openness of the (future) external 
borders diminishes the need for a high degree of impermeability in more than one way. First, 
by changing conceptions and definitions on who is or should be marked as a legal or illegal 
immigrant, more migration movements can be allowed and migrants will become more 
‘visible’ and ‘controllable’. Temporary work permits, for example, can reduce the felt 
necessity to enter the EU without proper documents. Second, by introducing a visa-free 
travel-regime with the eastern neighbours. The visa-requirements are an offence to the Ring 
of Friends, and at the same time they frustrate cross-border trade. Third, because cross-border 
co-operation can generate prosperity in the regions at the other side of the EU-borders, push-
factors to migrate (both documented and undocumented) lose their strength and pull-factors 
lose their appeal. An external border-regime constructed by the EU in such a way will 
decrease illegal immigration, inherently uncontrollable and intensely feared by the current EU 
member-states.  
 
An external border with a high degree of openness, combined with international relations of a 
friendly character with its neighbours, will not only enhance trade, but also security and 
legitimacy for the European Union. The empire-metaphor, as elaborated in section 4.1, in a 
certain sense suggests that non state-like bordering of the EU, with the EU slowly fading-out 
towards its periphery, might be a suitable solution. Cross-border co-operation can contribute 
to the shaping of the EU in such a manner. Furthermore, this form of co-operation with future 
non-EU border regions might provide an additional impetus for multi-level governance in the 
EU. However, the current reality is that the geographically enlarged internal market 
programme implies an (increased) attempt at ‘freezing’ (immobilising) the outer borders of 
the European Union, while at the same time programmes are set up to increasingly ‘liquefy’ 
(mobilise) its internal borders (Van Houtum, 2002). This contradiction is fundamental for 
understanding  the re-bordering of the European Union.  
 
 
5.1 Cross-border political networking 
 
Cross-border institutional co-operation is seen as instrumental in promoting European 
integration and facilitating the process of enlargement. The European Union (as well as 
several member states) has been actively supportive of cross-border co-operation initiatives 
(opportunity structures) in order to foster good neighbourliness and cultural understanding, 
enhance economic networking, and encourage regional and local participation in policy-
making. In terms of governance, cross-border region-building appears to signify new 
opportunities for the articulation of local and regional interests and the development of 
transnational alliances addressing a variety of policy issues. The apparent emergence of 
transboundary and transnational regionalisms (not only within Europe) has been interpreted as 
part and parcel of an ongoing ‘renaissance’ of regional scale in areas of economic and 
political governance (Sparke, 2001).  
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5.1.1 Transferring cross-border institution-building 
 
As a clear example of ‘policy-transfer’, cross-border institution-building, relatively successful 
in the Western European context, has been encouraged in CEECs through the establishment 
of various intergovernmental bodies and local and regional co-operation with the express duty 
of co-ordinating cross-border co-operation activities. The creation of Euroregions (or 
Euregions), cross-border associations of local government, has been particularly favoured. 
These associations represent an additional tier of regional ‘administration’ and play a vital 
role in channelling INTERREG and PHARE cross-border co-operation funds into border 
regions; it is their responsibility to develop cross-border regional development programmes 
that, having received approval by senior governments and the EU, serve as operational plans 
for the disbursement of project grants.7 Similarly, with regard to the CIS and Russia, the 
TACIS programme facilitates cross-border co-operation initiatives. Here however, the direct 
transfer of EU policy is rather less in evidence. 
  
As the EU’s boundaries shift geographically, it will be necessary to investigate the extent to 
which meaningful forms of conflict prevention, problem-solving and other forms of collective 
action are emerging in Central and Eastern European border regions. In what ways can cross-
border regionalisation in these countries contribute to European multilevel governance? An 
increase in regional inequalities within the 2004 accession-states is expected by some (The 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and The Forward Studies Unit, 1999). This will 
not be without repercussions on the internal debates in these states on regional initiatives for 
cross-border co-operation. Future enlargement will be influenced by the successes and 
failures, as perceived by different actors, in regard to former enlargement-events and 
experiences. A further essential characteristic of the enlargement debate is formed by the 
declining willingness of the current member states to contribute to the Structural and 
Cohesion Funds. The candidate member-states, both the countries that will enter the EU in 
2004, as well as the countries that are likely to become member-states in later stages (i.e. 
Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and the Western Balkan-countries), will probably not receive an 
equal amount of financial support as different regions in, for example, Portugal, Spain and 
Italy during former rounds of accession. Here, the Schengen-acquis plays a crucial role in the 
preconditions for cross-border co-operation as well. This acquis can further disrupt cultural 
and economic ties between countries (Robert Schuman Centre for Advances Studies/The 
Forward Studies Unit, 1999). Trade between Poland and Ukraine, for example, has decreased 
since the imposition of the Schengen-acquis on Poland.  
 
5.1.2 Compatibility of funding schemes: towards a New Neighbourhood Instrument 
 
In the new border regions diverse socio-economic conditions and practices increasingly 
confront each other, opening prospects for trade and co-operation but, at the same time, often 
encouraging undesirable and illegal activities and even resulting in misunderstanding and 
conflict. The debate on cross-border regional governance also concerns Cross-Border Funding 
Schemes (PHARE CBC, INTERREG, TACIS). Particularly, the problem of separate and 
incompatible funding arrangements between member and non-member states has been a cause 
of concern in recent years (s.f. CEC, COM 2001/437; CEC, COM 2002/660). In 2002, an in-
depth investigation was carried out by the ‘Notre Europe’ Research Agency together with the 
                                                          
7
 The EU Directive 94/C 180/13 (paragraph A5) explicitly states that the national operational programmes for 
INTERREG - as the basis for distributing funds to the various recipient regions - are to be developed by national, 
regional and local governments working in concert. Euroregions, as associations of local governments, have thus 
been singled out as an ideal vehicle for obtaining local-level input into the structural programming process. 
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Italian Association of Chambers of Commerce, ‘Unioncamere’. Each of the six case study 
border regions under scrutiny8 was facing co-ordination problems between the various 
funding arrangements, some to a considerable extent. One of the contributors indicated that in 
his case study region, ‘cross-border co-operation has suffered from the Union’s failure to 
harmonise the INTERREG and PHARE programmes’ (Notre Europe and Unioncamere, 2002: 
4).  
 
Respondents from DG Enlargement, however, indicated not to be particularly worried about 
this, as ‘INTERREG III and PHARE CBC have the same implementation procedures’ 
(Interview with DG Enlargement, 12-5-2003). Although it would seem that this particular 
statement underestimates the practical everyday problems encountered in the border regions, 
DG Enlargement is currently developing a New Neighbourhood Instrument, destined to 
implement the Commission’s New Neighbourhood Policy as laid down in the Wider Europe 
Communication. The Instrument will ‘introduce into the scope of cross-border co-operation 
additional, wider geopolitical objectives which will become increasingly important after 
enlargement’ (CEC, COM 2003/393). These geopolitical objectives range from fighting 
transnational crime and terrorism to nourishing local cultural ties across the external border 
(CEC, COM 2003/104 and CEC, COM 2003/393). As from 2006, the New Neighbourhood 
Instrument is to replace all existing programmes, including, apart from INTERREG and 
PHARE CBC, Tacis, CARDS and Meda (CEC, COM 2003/393). From 2004 until 2006, so-
called Neighbourhood Programmes will be introduced as an intermediate step in this 
convergence process of current cross-border funding schemes. The  following measures will 
be taken: 
 
• A specific funding allocation, within the current financial perspectives, will be made 
within the relevant external instruments to the area covered by each Neighbourhood 
programme. The funding for the Member State(s) concerned would be fixed by the 
Commission decision adopting the Structural Fund element of the programme; 
• The programme’s priorities will take account of necessary objectives and activities on 
both sides of the border and the aims and objectives of the Wider Europe 
Communication; 
• The rules governing the programme’s committee structures will ensure a balanced 
membership from both sides of the border, and include the appropriate representation 
of the Commission; 
• A single application process and a single selection process will operate for each 
programme covering both the internal and the external element of a single project; 
• Procedures for a final decision on the external and internal components of the jointly 
selected projects, and for contracting and making payments, will remain those 
required by the relevant regulations; 
• Procedures for monitoring, reporting and evaluation will be harmonised for both 
components. A system for a regular exchange of best practices and experiences on the 
basis of the results of the various projects should also be encouraged. 
(CEC, COM 2003/393, p. 10) 
 
The New Neighbourhood Instrument has received rather strong criticism from the side of the 
Association of European Border Regions (AEBR). Holding the opinion that INTERREG in 
itself will provide sufficient means for co-operation across EU-borders (both internal and 
external) after enlargement, the AEBR considers the Instrument unnecessarily complicating. 
Although the organisation welcomes the proposals to enhance programming procedures and 
                                                          
8
 West Pannonia between Austria and Hungary, the Baltic Sea Region, the Sea Alps Region between France and 
Italy, the Engrensis Euroregion between the Czech Republic and Germany, the Belgian-French border region 
and finally, the Ionian Sea co-operation initiative between Greece and Italy. 
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overall co-ordination, they firmly state that: ‘external funding programmes adapt to 
INTERREG rules and not vice versa’ (AEBR statement, 2003, p. 4). Furthermore, the AEBR 
argues that some of the ‘wider geo-political objectives’ can be better targeted through the 
existing INTERREG B (transnational co-operation) and C (interregional co-operation) 
programmes, as the proposed mix of targets under a sole instrument will considerably 
decrease transparency and may cause many practical difficulties.  
 
5.1.3 Cross-border governance capacities 
 
There is some concern about an ongoing lack of ‘administrative competence’ at sub-national 
levels in transition states (Brown, 2002; Kennard, 2002).  Such a euphemism fails to capture a 
more long-term and structural problem, however, instantiated by a fundamental contradiction 
between the inclusionary dynamic of cross-border networking and the exclusionary logic of 
the Schengen acquis. As the experience of Euroregio Karelia (Finland-Russia), Euroregion 
Pomerania (Germany-Poland-Sweden), Carpathian Euroregion (Poland-Ukraine-Slovakia-
Hungary-Romania), Nieman Euroregion (Poland-Belarus-Lithuania) and Bug Euroregion 
(Poland-Ukraine-Belarus) attest, for instance, what little progress in cross-border 
collaboration has occurred in the realm of tourism, university exchanges, and regional trade 
fairs has been eroded by a Schengen regime that will only serve to exacerbate existing cross-
border asymmetries (Virtanen, 2004; Kennard, 2004).  Left unresolved, this contradiction can 
only serve to produce an indeterminate and arbitrary cross-border governance structure in 
which unregulated cross-border flows of illicit goods (drugs, weapons, contraband 
commodities), capital (money laundering, etc.), and individuals (human trafficking, illegal 
immigration) continue to flourish with impunity (Krätke, 1999).   
 
In the case of attempts by Nordic and Baltic states to create a ‘Northern Dimension’ to EU 
policy-making against the wider backdrop of European enlargement and peaceful co-
development with Russia, some observers have highlighted the  multi-scalar ‘dimensionality’ 
of the Northern Dimension’s regionalization initiatives (Scott, 2004). Whereas an older form 
of Baltic Sea regionalism engaged exclusively with sovereign nation-states, the ‘new 
regionalism’ represented by the Northern Dimension, while recognizing the ongoing 
relevance of states, emphasizes the increased political significance of sub-national and non-
state actors; where issues of security dominated previous cross-border agendas, they are now 
complemented by environmental, economic and social issues articulated at local and regional 
scales. Within this transformed geo-political context, the Northern Dimension is understood 
as an expression of the increasing ‘hybridity’ of governance modes emphasizing functional 
international co-operation, including the strengthening of democratic civil society.  
Paradoxically, as a condition of its founding, the Northern Dimension has been deprived of 
resources so as not to elicit opposition from Southern European member states nor incur 
Russian resistance to post-Westphalian notions of geo-political discourse (Scott, 2004). The 
degrees of freedom available the ‘selective scalings of ‘we’ and ‘them’ categories’ at work in 
post-Cold War Baltic Sea space would therefore seem to remain strongly conditioned by the 
palpable presence of Europe’s South as well as its Eastern ‘near-abroad’. 
 
 
5.2 Migration, border control and citizenship 
 
As laid down in two Commission proposals published in 2001, permanent access into 
European Union space is granted to those third-country nationals who are either in the 
possession of a signed labour agreement, or self-employed (CEC, COM 2001/127 and CEC, 
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COM 2001/386). A far greater number of Commission documentation, however, concerns the 
closing of the border for residents of third-country nationals. The Centre for European Policy 
Studies, most notably justice and home experts Joanna Apap and Malcolm Anderson, has 
published widely on the issue of how to balance security and migration issues in an enlarging 
European Union (c.f. CEPS, 2001, 2002a, 2002b).  
 
5.2.1 Transferring migration issues to the supranational level  
 
A complicating factor in this respect is the importance national governments attach to 
maintaining sovereignty over migration policies, which is reflected in the institutional 
structure of DG Justice and Home Affairs. The DG’s activities are currently organised in the 
three different pillars. The second pillar, related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
is the least eminent structure in which DG JHA operates. With the signing of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997) a rather high number of competencies of JHA was transferred from the 
third (Justice and Home Affairs) pillar to the first (Communautarian) pillar. The internal 
market program as well as monetary-policy are part of this first pillar, but with regard to the 
work of DG JHA of particular importance are the transfer of the fields of border controls, the 
issue of visas, the circulation of nationals of third countries within the territory of the 
Community, as well as measures concerning asylum and immigration policy. However, the 
different member-states insist on retaining their sovereignty in criminal matters. Criminal 
justice co-operation is currently elaborated on an intergovernmental basis within the third 
pillar. Especially the distinction between the first (competence transferred to the community 
level) and the third (competence retained at the national level) pillars causes ambiguity in the 
division of powers (CEPS, 2002b). This is the case because of the particular political 
sensitivity of activities in the field of justice and home affairs, which is only being reinforced 
by (post-) 9/11 and 3/11 developments and subsequent discourses of terrorist threat and risk 
society.   
 
During the European Council reunion in Sevilla (2002), it was not only decided that measures 
needed to be taken in relation to managing the external borders, but also in regard to setting 
up a common risk-analysis model, in order to achieve a common and integrated risk analysis 
on immigration issues. The emphasis placed on internal security is not a totally recent 
phenomenon. The second (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and third (Justice and 
Home Affairs) pillars of the EU have developed at different rates during the 1990’s (Pastore, 
2002). The importance and influence of the third pillar has grown much faster and has 
virtually overtaken the second pillar, leading to an asymmetrical concern for internal security 
vis à vis external security. However, the 9/11 and 3/11 attacks have indeed contributed to the 
blurring of the borders between these policy-areas, not only in the United States, but also in 
the European Union. Furthermore, the Ministries of Justice and Home Affairs in the several 
member states are reluctant to give up sovereignty in this area, thereby holding on to co-
operation within the third pillar. 
  
According to our spokesman, DG Justice and Home Affairs is currently preparing far-
reaching organisational changes in order to resolve the problem of the ambiguity of division 
of powers (Interview with DG Justice and Home Affairs, 5-9-2003). In the view of the Centre 
for European Policy Studies, this should imply ‘transferring a maximum of competence to the 
first pillar … retaining a minimum of the most sensitive areas as the exclusive responsibility 
of the member states’ (CEPS, 2002b, p. 54). 
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5.2.2 Bordering undocumented immigrants 
 
Illegal migration is the issue which, according to our document sources, especially requires an 
intensified co-ordination among the present and new member states. The second half of 2003 
indeed witnessed a whole range of proposals released by DG Justice and Home Affairs, 
addressing the development of a common policy on illegal immigration, human trafficking 
and the management of external borders towards this purpose (s.f. CEC, COM 2003/687; 
CEC, COM 2003/323; CEC, COM 2003/664 and CEC, COM 2003/452). The documents 
again reveal a dominant rhetoric in favour of ‘returning illegal residents’. Towards this end, 
the Commission has proposed the establishment of a European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders (CEC, COM 2003/687). Apart from 
providing assistance to member states with regard to the training of border guards, the 
Agency’s mission is defined as: 
 
concerning the co-ordination and organisation of joint return operations, the Agency will 
provide member states with the necessary technical support in organising joint return 
operations, e.g. by developing a network of contact points to that end, by keeping an up-
to-date inventory of existing and available resources and facilities, or by preparing 
specific guidelines and recommendations on joint return operations (CEC, COM 
2003/687, p. 6). 
 
The proposed Agency, which otherwise will not have any law enforcement competencies in 
the member states themselves, is thus given the difficult task of coordinating operational 
cooperation between member states towards the removal of third-country nationals illegally 
residing in European Union space. The Communication ‘On the Development of a Common 
Policy on Illegal Immigration, Smuggling and Trafficking of Human Beings, External 
Borders and the Return of Illegal Residents’ lists a whole range of policy measures to be co-
ordinated by the Agency (CEC, COM 2003/323). These measures are grouped into visa 
policy, return policy and flanking measures.  
 
Judging from the European Council of Sevilla’s (2002) statements on migration issues, the 
events of 9/11 have strengthened the perceived inevitability of constructing a restrictive 
(common) immigration policy. As a result, a distinct fear of illegal, or uncontrollable 
immigration has become more clearly visible. Several proposals regarding the conditions 
under which illegal migrants may be sent back, for example in relation to partnerships with 
countries of origin and obligatory measures for these countries enjoining them to accept return 
migrants, have been accepted. When the cooperation of third countries is considered 
insufficient, international relations are perceived to be undermined. Under these conditions, 
sanctions are to be taken by the EU in order to enforce this policy of return (European Council 
of Sevilla, 2002).  
 
Not only do emerging EU immigration- and asylum-policies have a rather restrictive nature, 
also visa-policy seems to function as a tool for letting in those who bring wealth, and at the 
same time keeping out those who bring burden. The European Commission draws up two 
visa-lists. One list is made up of states whose inhabitants don’t require a visa for entrance to 
the EU and another list of states whose nationals do require such a visa. There are currently 
132 countries on the latter list (Common List, Annex 1, Council Regulation 539/2001), all of 
which have populations with a low average income. All African states are listed in this 
Annex, as well as virtually the entire Caribbean region and the less prosperous states of Latin-
America and Asia.  
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The European Commission uses an evaluative system consisting of three criteria in assessing 
whether a state should be put on the ‘black’ list. Third country nationals are considered a risk 
first and foremost when there is a possibility that they will reside in the EU illegally after 
entering. The second criterion is related to the third country nationals’ influence on public 
security. When, for instance, drug policies of a third country are regarded as insufficient, this 
state is placed on the ‘black’ list. The third and final criteria is constituted by the international 
relations that exist between the EU and the relevant state (Guild, 2001). The most restrictive 
measures in the EU’s visa-policy are made with regard to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Somalia and Sri Lanka. Nationals of one of these twelve countries require an airport transit 
visa even when making an intermediate stop at an airport in the EU (Cholewinski, 2002). A 
large amount of the total number of asylum-seekers who enter the EU come from these 
countries. Thus, the EU appears to use it’s visa-policy not only as a tool to guarantee security, 
but also as a means of keeping the world’s poor out.   
 
With regard to visa policy, the Commission attaches special importance to the establishment 
of a common ‘Visa Information System’. For instance, this system is designed to combat visa 
fraud and irregularities committed by illegal immigrants and human traffickers. The use of 
advanced technologies in the field of biometric identification such as iris scanning, facial 
recognition and fingerprints should become customary in this respect. Thus inventing new 
means of personal identification in addition to passports, visas and residence permits, the 
Commission strives for an overall enhanced efficiency in controlling the Union’s future 
external border. Designing a common format for visas and creating common EU visa issuing 
offices should further contribute to efficiency (CEC, COM 2003/323). Furthermore, the ‘visa 
policy’ section of this Communication foresees the development of the acquis on local border 
traffic, which is discussed below. 
 
Proposals for the development of a return policy draw on the previously published ‘Green 
Paper on a Community Return Policy’. The idea behind this paper, which was subsequently 
elaborated into a Return Action Programme, was to express the importance the Commission 
attaches to co-operation with third countries. Towards this end, country return programmes 
should be designed and installed, at least on a bilateral but preferably on an integrated basis 
(CEC, COM 2003/323). In addition, co-operation between member states themselves should 
be enhanced, for instance in cases of transit for the purposes of removal by air. Recent 
developments in the Netherlands might serve to illustrate these forms of co-operation. At 
present, the forced repatriation of illegal migrants from Romania and Bulgaria is occurring on 
a fairly frequent basis in the Netherlands. Institutionalising these flows of return migration, 
two so-called ‘uitzetcentra’, detention centres have been installed recently at the Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam airports Shiphol and Zestienhoven, respectively. Having signed bilateral 
readmission agreements with national governments in both Sofia and Bucharest, Dutch 
policymakers are thus co-creating a trans-European institutional network of (re)migration, 
quite in accordance with the desires of the European Commission as expressed above. 
 
Finally, a number of key ‘flanking’ measures concern attempts to eliminate the smuggling and 
trafficking of human beings (CEC, COM 2003/323). On the supply as well as the demand side 
of the market for illegal labour, the Commission seeks to develop pro-active measures in 
order to combat the exploitation of human beings in an enlarging European Union. This 
involves the strengthening of a juridical framework enabling severe punishment for those 
committing crimes in the field of human trafficking. Measures will also be taken against the 
increasing amount of undeclared work in the European Union, which ‘tends to act as a pull 
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factor for illegal migration and can lead to exploitation and insecurity for the migrants 
involved’ (CEC, COM 2003/323, p. 10). Again, the need for strengthened co-operation with 
member states and third countries is brought forward in this respect. With regard to the 
former, the Commission explicitly advocates ‘burden sharing’ between member states and the 
Union for the management of external borders. With regard to the latter, the Commission 
introduces the concept of ‘leverage’: co-operating third countries might be rewarded with 
compensatory measures, such as a more generous visa policy, increased quotas for migrant 
workers, closer economic co-operation, trade expansion or additional development assistance 
(CEC, COM 2003/323).  
 
With regard to human-trafficking, there is a tendency to place responsibility more and more 
on air-transport carriers. The different member-states are seeking ways to be less 
confrontational with respect to problems involving visa controls. The Schengen 
Implementation Agreement, in this respect, states: 
 
The carrier shall be obliged to take all the necessary measures to ensure that an alien 
carried by air or sea is in possession of the travel documents required for entry into the 
territories of the Contracting parties (Schengen Implementation Agreement, Article 
26(1)(b)). 
 
‘White list’ travellers must only face immigration controls at the point of carrier check-in. 
‘Black list’ nationals will be checked further by carriers on the possession of a valid visa 
issued either by the state of destination or another Schengen-state. The carrier is the ultimate 
responsible body for the taking-in of third country nationals. When the carrier fails to provide 
an accurate determination whether an alien has the right to enter the EU or not, which leads to 
carrying an individual who is refused admission to the EU, it will face penalties including  the 
duty to take the individual back to the country of origin or the country which issued the travel 
documents, as well as receive fines for carrying the individual in the first place (Guild, 2001). 
Only train-services are exempt from this regulation. In past years, several air-transport as well 
as sea-based carriers have been penalised. 
 
5.2.3 Local border traffic 
 
The sensitive issue of regulating local traffic in border areas along the European Union’s 
external border is taken up in a proposal for a Council regulation published in August 2003 
(CEC, COM 2003/502). This document distinguishes between two types of external land 
borders. The first type consists of the border between member states and neighbouring third 
countries (non-member states) such as Poland-Belarus and Estonia-Russia. For the time being, 
this includes state boundaries between member and accession countries on the one hand and 
candidate countries on the other, such as Greece-Bulgaria and Hungary-Romania. The second 
type of external land borders as distinguished by the Commission concerns the border 
between two actual member states after the May 2004 enlargement, which are involved in 
different stages of the implementation of the Schengen regime. This type includes the border 
between member states fully implementing and neighbouring member states not yet fully 
implementing the Schengen acquis, such as Germany-Poland, as well as the border between 
member states which are both not fully implementing the Schengen acquis, such as Slovakia 
and Hungary (CEC, COM 2003/502).  
 
The proposal offers no clear definition for the concept of ‘border area’, which is otherwise 
used frequently throughout the document. In practice, the precise territorial demarcation of 
what constitutes ‘the border zone’ is left to national authorities: 
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‘border area’ means an area which, as the crow flies, does not extend more than 50 
kilometres from the frontier. Within this area, the local administrative districts which are 
to be considered as part of the border can be further specified by the concerned states 
(CEC, COM 2003/502, p. 20).  
 
Residents of these border areas are granted the right to obtain a special travel permit, enabling 
them to freely cross the external border in order to pursue social and economic activities. 
These documents will be labelled ‘L’ (Local), distinguishing them from regular travel 
permits.  
 
Apart from establishing and maintaining socio-economic ties, an important side-effect of this 
policy may be the nourishing of cultural links between peoples of the same ‘ethnic affinities’, 
which gain additional importance in the context of proximity (CEC, COM 2003/104). Within 
the ‘Euromosaïc’ that is the landscape of population groups in Europe, visa rights and 
citizenship of ethnic minorities remain important cross-border issues indeed. Ethnic Russians 
living in Estonia and Hungarians in Romania are among the best known examples of such 
deeply rooted historical relationships. In this respect, however, it need not be forgotten that 
neighbourhood relationships in the region stretching from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea 
have not always been as ‘friendly’ as the Commission would like them to be in its Wider 
Europe Communication, with ‘fear and prejudice dominating among the population’ still 
(AEBR statement, 2003, p. 2). It is precisely this fear of the unknown ‘other’ that cross-border 
co-operation seeks to overcome. Supranational policy meant to locally increase ‘openness’ at 
the EU’s external border stands merely at a beginning, yet already provides a friendly 
counterpart to those hostile visualisations of ‘impermeability’ that will still abound in the 
upcoming years. 
 
 
 
6 CONCLUSION: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The Singapore-based British geographer James Sidaway has recently remarked that the 
European Union has ‘no essence’ (2004). In the light of the archival research and fieldwork 
interviews conducted by this team for the Supranational Level Studies, we believe this would 
be an accurate characterisation of the perceptions, policies and practices of the EU with 
respect to its future external borders. In the matter of its own outer membrane with Russia, the 
former member states of the Soviet Union, as well as the Southern Mediterranean Rim, 
Europe does not speak with one voice. This should not come as any surprise, of course. What 
is perhaps more interesting (and pressing) from a policy standpoint is the divergence of 
contending agendas at play in defining the nature and mode of governing Europe’s newly 
minted external boundary, suggesting very real institutional tensions within the heart of the 
EU policy-making apparatus. In practice (although perhaps not in rhetoric) this discounts at 
once an EU ‘boiler plate’ approach to the discrepant cross-border case-studies under 
examination subsequent to this study.   
 
As is evinced in this report, no internal EU consensus exists on the question of the nature and 
timing of future membership. Beyond the rather technocratic terms used as benchmarks for 
EU accession, agreement on Turkey’s membership threshold remains elusive, and, a 
breakthrough in Cyprus notwithstanding, ultimately political in nature. Even under the 
relative momentum of the ‘Wider Europe Communication’ and more recent Balkan 
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initiatives, the final definition regarding which states shall enter into Europe’s ‘Ring of 
Friends’ remains a highly open-ended process contingent on an ensemble of strategically 
indeterminate variables. Currently, these would seem to favour active integration of the 
countries of the Western Balkans into European Community programs rather than nations of 
the former Soviet sphere of influence, but such priorities could easily shift in the face of 
alternate geopolitical imperatives.   
 
The authors consider it significant that no official interviewed for this study ventured to 
conjecture on what form of territorial entity the European Union will or should be consequent 
upon enlargement. Given that an underlying cartographic bias would appear to guide much of 
the Commission’s thinking regarding the direction and sequencing of enlargement (in the 
sense of a progressively eastward ‘domino theory’ of expansion), the absence of a ‘vision’ for 
the new European polity-in-the-making should raise concerns that at the heart of the 
Commission functionalist economic criteria may be gaining the upper hand in visualizing 
Europe’s future territorial identity, to the detriment of issues germane to the continent’s 
democratic development. For all the acuity of insight brought to bear by academic researchers 
into the imperial or post-Westphalian nature of the emergent European multi-level polity, it 
does not service to the inhabitants of the EU’s future external border regions to have such 
debates cloistered behind ivy walls and out of earshot of the policy-makers in Brussels.  
 
In the absence of a grand recit governing the EU’s future outward boundary line, it may be 
expected that judicious use of EU structural funds may facilitate ‘bottom-up’ solutions for the 
cross-border regions that Europe shares with non-EU partners. As the INTERREG cross-
border funding program increasingly shifts focus from Western to Eastern European accession 
states and their neighbours, this matter will become all the more pressing given the 
accelerating socio-economic inequalities that will surely be produced as a consequence of 
reinforcing the exclusionary mantle of the Schengen acquis. As the record of cross-border 
economic and political networking examined in this study indicates, however, much more 
remains to be done to ensure that a ‘fortress’ like boundary is attenuated in favour of more 
‘fluid’ and permeable transboundary governance structures. In reconciling the imperatives of 
Schengen and those of heightened transboundary institution-building across the future borders 
of Europe, closer co-ordination between the Commission’s Directorate General of Justice and 
Home Affairs and that of its Directorate General of Regional Policy is surely warranted. With 
regard to the latter office, a step in this direction must certainly confront the need to more 
adequately harmonise the various funding schemes between member and non-member states, 
notably INTERREG and PHARE. Against the backdrop of persistent co-ordination 
bottlenecks evident in this policy-making sphere, the New Neighbourhood Instrument is 
welcomed by many parties involved in cross-border co-operation in Europe, in spite of its 
shortcomings and preliminary status.   
 
Illegal immigration and human trafficking remain issues which will require an especially 
intensified co-ordination among the present and new member states at a Europe-wide level.  
Notable in this respect has been a flurry of recent Community initiatives meant to establish 
capacity at the member-state level for the purpose of organising ‘joint return’ operations.  
Lacking law enforcement competencies within the individual member states flanking non-
member countries, however, it remains an open question to what extent newly created entities 
such as the ‘European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation at the 
External Borders’ can negotiate the various repatriation, visa and ‘flanking’ agreements on a 
more comprehensive basis than those grounded in more limited, ad hoc, bilateral agreements.  
This remains a major challenge for Europe’s ‘bordering’ of undocumented immigrants. With 
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respect to the actions of third countries, it would be unfortunate and ultimately 
counterproductive if the handling of the issue of undocumented migration were to be used as a 
quid pro quo for future development aid, as currently considered. Such ‘leverage’ 
mechanisms could all too easily be manipulated according to volatile and unpredictable 
political conjunctures.   
 
From the evidence, it would appear that the goal of an effective and coherent border regime 
targeting legal as well as illegal migrants remains contingent on the resolution of an existing 
ambiguity in the separation of powers within DG Justice and Home Affairs. At the very least, 
it would be expected that the allocation of competencies between the first and third pillars of 
DG JHA be clarified in favour of the former (Communautarian) pillar, if only to provide 
supranational consistency to Europe’s future border migration regime in lieu of ad hoc 
nationally-oriented approaches in dealing with migration issues. With the contemporary rise 
in prominence in the Eastern European accession countries of populist groups which often 
operate on the basis of anti-immigrant political agendas, the question of such an institutional 
resolution has only become more urgent. It would be hoped that in the wake of the recent 
attacks in Madrid, and the co-ordinated response of European member states, the third pillar 
(Justice and Home Affairs) may be further diluted in the service of pan-European goals and 
objectives, thus providing a wider court of appeal to migrants affected by individual national 
legislation within accession home countries.    
 
From the foregoing it may be corroborated that, as regards governance of its future external 
boundary, the European Union, indeed, has no univocal ‘essence’. This insight should not 
serve as a pretext, however, for the Commission to absolve itself from ‘grand narratives’ 
regarding its newly expanded boundary. As is well known, nature abhors a vacuum. In this 
context, it would be imprudent if Europe’s approach to the cross-border regions straddling 
non-member states were left to be determined by the external vagaries of ideology or history 
alone. Political leadership and intellectual courage will be required to craft just such a vision.  
This report is meant as but a modest step in that direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Official EU documentation 
 
1 Auditors (2001). Special report concerning the Tacis cross-border cooperation programme 
together with the Commission’s replies. Official Journal of the European Communities 
C329/01: 18. 
 
2 Council of the European Union (2000). Northern Dimension - Action Plan for the 
Northern Dimension with external and cross-border policies of the European Union 2000-
2003.  
 
3 Enlargement Website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index. 
 
4 European Commision (2001). Tacis regional cooperation. Strategic considerations 2002-
2006 and indicative programme 2000-2003.  
 
5 European Commission (1985). The accomplishment of the Internal Market. White Paper 
from the Commission to the European Council. 
 
6 European Commission (2000). Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament on a Community Immigration Policy. COM (2000) 757 final. 
 
7 European Commission (2000). Tempus (Phare and Tacis) Annual Report 1998.  
 
8 European Commission (2001). Commission working document: The relationship between 
safeguarding internal security and complying with international protection obligations and 
instruments.  
 
9 European Commission (2001). Communication from the commission on the impact of 
enlargement on regions bordering candidate countries - community action for border 
regions. COM (2001) 437 final. 
 
10 European Commission (2001). Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament on a common policy on illegal immigration. COM (2001) 672 
final. 
 
11 European Commission (2001). Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament on an open method of co-ordination for the community 
immigration policy. COM (2001) 387 final. 
 
12 European Commission (2001). Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the status of 
third-country nationals who are long-term residents. COM (2001) 127 final. 
 
13 European Commission (2001). Proposal for a Council Directive laying down minimum 
standards on the reception of applicants for asylum in Member States. Official Journal of 
the European Communities C 213 E (COM 2001 181 final): 286-295. 
 
 27 
14 European Commission (2001). Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-
employed economic activities. COM (2001) 386 final. 
 
15 European Commission (2002). 2002 Annual Progress Report On the implementation of 
the Northern Dimension Action Plan. SEC (2002) 1296. 
 
16 European Commission (2002). Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament integrating migration issues in the European Union’s relations 
with third countries. COM (2002) 703 final. 
 
17 European Commission (2002). Green Paper on a community return policy on illegal 
residents. COM (2002) 175 final. 
 
18 European Commission (2002). Kaliningrad: Transit. COM (2002) 510 final. 
 
19 European Commission (2002). Progress report on the communication from the 
commission on the impact of enlargement on regions bordering candidate countries - 
community action for border regions. COM (2002) 660 final. 
 
20 European Commission (2002). Towards the enlarged Union: Strategy paper and report of 
the European Commission on the progress towards accession by each of the candidate 
countries. COM (2002) 700 final. 
 
21 European Commission (2002). The European Charter of border and cross-border regions. 
 
22 European Commission (2003). Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament. The Western Balkans and European Integration. COM (2003) 
285 final. 
 
23 European Commission (2003). Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament. Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for 
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours. COM (2003) 104 final. 
 
24 European Commission (2003). Communication from the Commission: Paving the way for 
a New Neighbourhood Instrument. COM (2003) 393 final. 
 
25 European Commission (2003). Continuing enlargement: Strategy paper and report for the 
European Commission on the progress towards accession by Bulgaria, Romania and 
Turkey. COM (2003) 676 final. 
 
26 European Commission (2003). Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament establishing a European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Co-operation at the external borders. COM (2003) 687 final/2. 
 
27 European Commission (2003). Proposal for a Council regulation on the establishment of 
local border traffic at the (temporary) external land borders of the Member States. COM 
(2003) 502 final. 
 
 28 
28 European Commission (2003). Commission communication on the development of a 
common policy on illegal immigration, smuggling and trafficking of human beings, 
external borders and the return of illegal residents.  
 
29 European Commission (2003). Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions on immigration, integration and employment.  
 
30 European Commission (2003). Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council in view of the European Council of Thessaloniki on the 
development of a common policy on illegal immigration, smuggling and trafficking of 
human beings, external borders and the return of illegal residents. COM (2003) 323 final. 
 
31 European Commission (2003). Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament towards more accessible, equitable and managed asylum 
systems.  
 
32 European Convention, Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for the European Union, 
2003 
 
33 European Council (1999). Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia. Official 
Journal of the European Communities: 1-9. 
 
34 European Council (1999). European Council Common Strategy on Ukraine. Official 
Journal of the European Communities: 1-8. 
 
35 European Council of Sevilla, Conclusions of the chairmanship, 2002 
 
36 European Council of Thessaloniki, Conclusions of the chairmanship, 2002 
 
37 European Council, Council Regulation No. 539/2001, Annex 1  
 
38 European Council. IV Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free 
movement of persons. Treaty establishing the European Community. 
 
39 European Parliament (2004). Report on Romania’s progress towards accession. A5-
0103/2004 final. 
 
40 Liebert, U. (2001). New governance and the prospects for a European sphere of publics, 
European Commission. 
 
41 Rasmussen, F., Solana, J., Prodi, R., Kuchma, L. (2002). Joint Statement. European 
Union-Ukraine Summit, Copenhagen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
Research reports 
 
1 Association of European Border Regions (2003). Statement of AEBR with regard to the 
New Neighbourhood Instrument at  http://www.aebr.net/publikationen/pdfs/. 
 
2 Arnaud, J. L. (2001). Crossborder and transnational cooperation, the new Europe is 
inventing itself in its margins, Seminar by Unioncamere & Notre Europe, Brussels. 
 
3 Centre for European Policy Studies (2001). Policy alternatives to Schengen border 
controls on the future EU external frontier. Proceedings of an expert seminar, Warsaw. 
 
4 Centre for European Policy Studies (2002a). The Sitra-Ceps programme on Justice and 
Home Affairs in an Enlarged European Union. Two-year substantive report on the main 
results, 2000-2002, Brussels. 
 
5 Centre for European Policy Studies (2002b). Striking a balance between Freedom, 
Security and Justice in an Enlarged European Union, Brussels. 
 
6 EXLINEA (2001). Research on the Policy of the European Commission towards the Re-
bordering of the European Union. Project Proposal and Technical Annex to the contract. 
 
7 Grabbe, H. (2002). The governance of the EU: Facing the challenge of enlargement, 
Centre for European Reform: 5. 
 
8 Houtum, H. van, O. Kramsch and R. Pijpers (2003). EXLINEA Theoretical Framework. 
Re-bordering the European Union: Scrutinizing the Border Regime of an Enlarging 
European Union. 
 
9 Marcou, G. (2002). Regional structures in the applicant countries and their compatibility 
with the Structural Funds. Scientific and Technological Options Assessment (STOA) - 
Recommendations and Executive Summary, European Parliament, Luxembourg. 
 
 
Academic references 
 
1 Anderson, J. (ed.) (2002) Transnational democracy: political spaces and border crossings. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
 
2 Anderson, J. (1996) The shifting stage of politics: new medieval and postmodern 
territorialities? Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 13, 2, 133-53. 
 
3 Baev, P. (1997) Russia’s Departure from Empire: Self-Assertiveness and a New Retreat, 
in:  Tunander, O., P. Baev and I. Einagel, Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe. Security, 
Territory and Identity, Prio, London: Sage Publications.  
 
4 Balibar, E. (2003) L’Europe, l’Amerique, la guerre. Paris: Editions la Decouverte. 
 
5 Borocz, J. and M. Kovacs (eds.) (2001) Empire’s new clothes: unveiling EU enlargement. 
Syracuse: Central Europe Review (CER). 
 
 30 
6 Brague, R. (1993) Europe: tous le chemins passent par Rome, Esprit, 32-40. 
 
7 Brown, D. (2002), Storming the Fortress: the External Border Regime in an Enlarged 
Europe, in H. Ingham and M. Ingham (eds.) EU Expansion to the East: Prospects and 
Problems,  Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
 
8 Buck-Morss, S. (2000) Dreamworld and catastrophe: the passing of mass utopia in east 
and west. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
9 Cholewinski, R. (2002) Borders and discrimination in the European Union, in: Anderson, 
M., and J. Apap, Police and justice co-operation and the new European Borders, Den 
Haag: Kluwer Law International. 
 
10 Christiansen, T. and K.E. Jorgenson (2000) Transnational governance ‘above’ and 
‘below’ the State: The changing nature of borders in the new Europe, in: Regional and 
Federal Studies, 10, 2, 62-77.  
 
11 Engel di Mauro, S. (forthcoming, 2005) The European’s burden: global imperialism in EU 
expansion. New York: Guilford. 
 
12 Farago, B. (1995) L’Europe: empire introubable, le debat, 83, 42-58. 
 
13 Guild, E. (2001) Moving the borders of Europe. Inaugural lecture, Nijmegen: CPO. 
 
14 Hansen, P. (2004) “In the name of Europe”, Race and Class, 45, 3, 49-62. 
 
15 Hansen, P. (2002) “European integration, European identity and the colonial connection”, 
European Journal of Social Theory, 5, 4, 483-98. 
 
16 Hellström, A. (2003) Beyond space: border making in European integration, the case of 
Ireland, Geografiska Annaler, 85, B, 123-135. 
 
17 Ham, P. van (2001) Europe’s postmodern identity: a critical appraisal, International 
Politics 38, 229-252. 
 
18 Herd, G. P. (2001), Russian Regionalism and the Evolution of Baltic Relations in: 
Joenniemi, P. and J. Viktorova (eds.) Regional Dimensions of Security in Border Areas of 
Northern and Eastern Europe, Tartu: University of Tartu Press. 
 
19 Hooghe, L. (ed.) (1996), Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-Level 
Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
20 Hooghe, L. and G. Marks (2001), Multi-Level Governance and European Integration, 
Lanham (Maryland) and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield. 
 
21 Houtum, H. van (2002), Borders of Comfort: Spatial Economic Bordering Processes in 
and by the European Union, in: Regional and Federal Studies, 12, 4.   
 
22 Houtum, H. van and T. van Naerssen (2002) Bordering, ordering and othering, in: 
Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 92, 2. 
 31 
 
23 Hudson, R. (2000) One Europe or many? Reflections on becoming European, Trans Inst 
Br Geogr, 25, 409-426. 
 
24 Kennard, A. (2004) Cross-border governance at the future eastern edges of the EU: a 
regeneration project?, O. Kramsch and B. Hooper (eds.) Cross-border governance in the 
European Union.  London: Routledge. 
 
25 Kennard, A. (2002), The Changing Role of Border Regions in Central and Eastern 
Europe, in H. Ingham and M. Ingham (eds.) EU expansion to the east: prospects and 
problems,  Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
 
26 Kolossov, V. (1998) Geopolitical scenarios for Eastern and Central Europe in a Post-
bipolar World, in: Carter, F. W., P. Jordan and V. Rey (eds.) Central Europe after the Fall 
of the Iron Curtain. Geopolitical perspectives, spatial patterns and trends, Österreichischen 
Ost- und Südosteuropa-Institut, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH.  
 
27 Kramsch, O. (2002) Re-imagining the scalar topologies of cross-border governance: 
eu(ro)regions in the post-colonial present, Space and Polity [Special Issue: The 
Geopolitics of Cross-Border Cooperation in the European Union, James Sidaway coord.], 
6, 2, 169-196. 
 
28 Krätke, S. (1999), Regional Integration or Fragmentation? The German-Polish Border 
Region in a New Europe, Regional Studies, 33 (7), pp. 631-641. 
 
29 Laitin, D.D. (1997) The cultural identities of a European State, Politics and Society, 25, 3, 
277-302. 
 
30 Langer, J. (1999) Towards a conceptualization of border: the Central European 
experience,  in: Eskelinen, J., Liikanen and Oksa (red.) (1999) Curtains of Iron and Gold. 
Reconstructing borders and scales of interaction, Aldershot: Ashgate.  
 
31 Laidi, Z. (1998), A World Without Meaning. The Crisis of Meaning in International 
Politics, London and New York: Routledge. 
 
32 Lipponen, P. (1999), Recognising Cultural Diversity, ARSIS, Vol. 1. 
 
33 Maresceau, M. and E. Lannon (ed.) (2001) The EU's enlargement and Mediterranean 
strategies: a comparative analysis. Houndmills: Palgrave. 
 
34 Mourier, P.F. (1993) Eloge de Rome, Esprit, 5-31.  
 
35 Notre Europe and Unioncamere (2002) Cross-border and transnational co-operation, the 
new Europe is inventing itself in its margins, Brussels. 
 
36 Paasi, A. (1996) Territories, boundaries and consciousness: the changing geographies of 
the Finnish-Russian boundary.  New York: J. Wiley & Sons. 
 
37 Pastore, F. (2002) The Asymmetrical Fortress: The Problem of Relations between Internal 
and External Security Policies in the European Union, in: Anderson, M., and J. Apap, 
 32 
Police and justice co-operation and the new European Borders, Den Haag: Kluwer Law 
International.  
 
38 Scott, J.W. (2004) The Northern Dimension: ‘multiscalar’ regionalism in an enlarging 
European Union?, in O. Kramsch and B. Hooper (eds.) Cross-border governance in the 
European Union.  London: Routledge. 
 
39 Scott, J.W. (2002) A networked space of meaning? Spatial politics as geostrategies of  
European integration, Space & Polity [Special Issue: The Geopolitics of Cross-border 
Cooperation in the European Union, James Sidaway coord.], 6, 2, 147-167. 
 
40 Shore, C. (2000)  Building Europe: the cultural politics of European integration, London: 
Routledge. 
 
41 Sidaway, J. (2004) The choreographies of European integration: negotiating transfrontier 
cooperation in Iberia, in O. Kramsch and B. Hooper (eds.) Cross-border governance in the 
European Union.  London: Routledge. 
 
42 Sparke, M. (2001), Hyphen-Nation-States: Critical Geographies of Displacement and 
Disjuncture, St.Paul Minneaspolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
43 The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and The Forward Studies Unit (1999) 
The long term implications of EU enlargement. The nature of the new border, Florence: 
European University Institute. 
 
44 Tunander, O., P. Baev and I. Einagel (eds.) (1997) Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe. 
Security, Territory and Identity, Prio, Sage Publications, London. 
 
45 Tunander, O. (1997) Post-Cold War Europe: A Synthesis of a Bipolar Friend-Foe 
Structure and a Hierarchic Cosmos-Chaos Structure? in: Tunander, O., P. Baev and I. 
Einagel (eds.) Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe. Security, Territory and Identity, Prio, 
London: Sage Publications. 
 
46 Verheugen, G. (2000), Enlargement of the European Union: What Lies Ahead?, speech 
given at the European Ministerial Conference on the Information Society, 11 May 2000, 
in Vienna, DOC:SPEEECH/00/178. 
 
47 Virtanen, P. (2004) Facing challenges on the eastern border of the European Union: the 
examples of Euregio Karelia and Euregion Pomerania, in O. Kramsch and B. Hooper 
(eds.) Cross-border governance in the European Union.  London: Routledge. 
 
48 Waever, O. (1997) Imperial metaphors: emerging European analogies to pre-Nation-State 
Imperial Systems, in: Tunander, O., P. Baev and I. Einagel (eds.) Geopolitics in Post-Wall 
Europe. Security, Territory and Identity, Prio, London: Sage Publications. 
 
49 Walters, W. (in press, 2004) The frontiers of the European Union: a geostrategic 
perspective, Geopolitics (Special Issue on Postnational Politics in the European Union, J. 
Agnew coord.), 9, 3. 
 
 33 
50 Xenakis, D.K. and D. Chryssochoou (2001) The emerging Euro-Mediterranean system. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
51 Zielonka, J. (2001) How new enlarged borders will reshape the European Union, Journal 
of Common  Market Studies, 39, 3, 507-536. 
 
 
 34 
 
ANNEX I: INTERVIEW REQUEST LETTER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
      
      
      
      
      
 
 
      
      
 
 
 
Dear Mrs./Mr. _____ , 
 
As researchers funded under the auspices of a 5th European Framework grant1, we have been entrusted 
over the next 3 years to examine capacities for building effective “cross-border regimes” in the form 
of cooperative structures, governance practices and conflict-minimizing dialogue across national 
borders in Central and Eastern European border areas in anticipation of EU enlargement.  The 
timeliness of this research agenda is predicated on the observation that as the EU takes on new 
members, socio-economic and political transformations are taking place at its borders which are of 
signal importance for the future security and identity of the emerging European polity.   
 
Using theoretically informed case study methodology, we seek to analyze the relationships between 
regional “problematiques” and opportunity structures for dialogue and cooperation across the 
following borderlands: Finland-Russia, Estonia-Russia, Poland-Ukraine, Hungary-Romania-Ukraine, 
Romania-Moldova, Greece-Bulgaria, Germany-Poland, Austria-Hungary, and Cyprus.  The project 
thus seeks out conditioning parameters of transboundary cooperation that function at three 
interconnected spatial levels: supranational (European), national, and local (cross-border regional).  
Consistencies and discrepancies between these three levels are to be assessed, with the resulting 
patterns serving to define concrete transboundary co-operation “regimes”, the overall results of which 
will inform understanding of the interrelatedness of various factors in conditioning (trans)boundary 
cooperation, while providing context-sensitive insights into possible regional development and 
governance strategies for regions on the European Union’s external borders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nijmegen 
School of 
Management 
Department of Human 
Geography and Spatial Planning 
 
your reference our reference  date 
concerning 
enclosure(s) 
 
 
 Tel + 31 (0)24  361 1924 Mailing address: Visiting address: 
       + 31 (0)24  361 2099 P.O. Box 9108 Thomas van Aquinostr 3 
 Fax + 31 (0)24 361 1841 NL-6500 HK Nijmegen Nijmegen 
 The Netherlands The Netherlands 
  
27/272200 
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It is in the context of the foregoing, and given your leadership role within the EU’s _____ responsible 
for negotiating the terms of Poland’s accession to the EU, that we would like to have the opportunity 
to discuss with you the Commission’s policy strategy for Poland’s future border regime with Ukraine.  
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union [Article 12(2)], the Agreement on Partnership and 
Cooperation (PCA) between the European Communities, Member States and Russia/Ukraine (March 
1, 1998), and European Council Common Strategy2, we are particularly keen in assessing your 
perception of the role of cross-border cooperation in achieving the following “strategic goals” of the 
EU:  
 
1) “[T]o contribute to the emergence of a stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Russia/Ukraine, 
governed by the rule of law and underpinning a stable functioning market economy which will 
benefit all the people of Russia/Ukraine; 
 
2) [T]o cooperate with Russia/Ukraine in the maintenance of stability and security in Europe and the 
wider world, and in finding effective responses to common challenges facing the continent; 
 
3) [T]o increase economic, political and cultural cooperation with Russia/Ukraine as well as 
cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs.”  (ECCS, 1999: 1-2) 
 
In light of these objectives, we would like to be informed as to the future role of specific instruments 
of cross-border community policy in achieving these aims.  Particularly, given the Commission’s 
stated aim “to ensure a smooth transition of border regions and to sustain public support for 
enlargement” (CEC, 2001: 4), we are interested in the policy weight currently being attached to cross-
border development as envisioned for the future border regime linking Poland and Ukraine within the 
arenas of transport and environmental infrastructure, the re-orientation of structural funding 
instruments, support for small-to-medium enterprises, youth and labor training,  information activities 
in border regions and rural development.  In eliciting a response from you on these issues, we would 
be particularly keen to obtain your professional assessment on the possibility and likelihood of the 
external border regime under your watch becoming a space of closure rather than of transparency and 
openness, of exclusion rather than inclusion and positive integration.  This concern stems largely from 
the observation of a fundamental tension inherent in the EU’s future border regimes with non-Europe, 
reflected in a bifurcation between EU-level discourses of an internally mobile “borderless Europe”, on 
the one hand, and the application of the Schengen Agreement to the EU’s eastern fringes on the other, 
which will act to severly clamp down on cross-border migrant flows from outside the EU deep into the 
foreseeable future.  In short, we invite you to reflect aloud with us on these and other potentially vital 
“paradoxes” shadowing the construction of openly democratic transboundary regimes within your 
geographical zone of responsibility.   
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Against the backdrop of the foregoing, we would request the opportunity to meet with you for no more 
than one (1) hour to discuss these issues within the framework of a semi-structured questionnaire, to 
occur preferably within a calendar window extending from _____ - _____, 2003/4.  Within this time-
frame, we would be more than willing to meet at your Brussels office on the date and time of your 
choosing. Should you have any questions regarding our request, please do not hesitate to contact me 
[Tel. 31 24 361-2725; Fax 31 24 361-1841; Email: H.vanHoutum@nsm.kun.nl].   
 
 
 
Mrs./Mr. _____, we look forward hearing from you at your earliest convenience. 
 
 
Cordially, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
Dr. Henk van Houtum, on behalf of the EXLINEA Team 
Dr. Olivier Thomas Kramsch 
Drs. Roos Pijpers 
Nijmegen Centre for Border Research 
Department of Human Geography 
Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen 
Postbus 9108 
6500 HK Nijmegen 
The Netherlands 
 
 
1
 EXLINEA: “Lines of Exclusion as Arenas of Co-operation: Reconfiguring the External Boundaries 
of Europe – Policies, Practices, Perceptions” [HPSE-CT-2002-00141]  
 
2
 Official Journal of the European Communities (1999) European Council Common Strategy of 11 
December 1999 on Ukraine.  Brussels. Council of Europe. 
 
3
 Commission of the European Communities (2001) Communication from the Commission on the 
Impact of Enlargement on Regions Bordering Candidate Countries. Community Action for Border 
Regions.  Brussels: European Commission. 
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ANNEX II: SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The subsequent themes and questions are relevant: 
 
1) Re-bordering: migration, nationalism, security 
1a External migration 
 
• What is your estimation and evaluation of external East-West (labour) migration after EU-
enlargement? 
• Why will there not be an open market for third-country nationals? 
• How will the internal market be secured and protected? 
• Can you name examples of particular success or failure with regard to this protectionism? 
• Would you subscribe to the idea of a paradox with strategic selectivity in migration 
policies and practices (replacement migration)? 
• What is your evaluation of EU liberal free trade ideology? Do you see the EU as a firm? 
 
1b Internal migration 
• What is your estimation and evaluation of internal East-West (labour) migration after EU-
enlargement? 
• Do you expect emphasis on (labour) migration or commuting mobility? 
• How do you evaluate the link between structural funds and endogenous economic growth 
versus ‘structured’ migration? 
• Why does a transition period exist in the implementation of the Schengen acquis? 
Introduction: 
- Dr. Henk van Houtum, assistant professor: H.vanHoutum@nsm.kun.nl 
- Dr. Olivier Kramsch, research fellow:  O.Kramsch@nsm.kun.nl  
- Drs. Roos Pijpers, PhD-student:   R.Pijpers@nsm.kun.nl  
- Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, Dept. of Human Geography, University of Nijmegen, 
the Netherlands (www.kun.nl/ncbr) 
 
EXLINEA: 
- Is an acronym of Lines of Exclusion as Arenas of Co-operation 
- Is about the construction of new external border regimes in Central and Eastern Europe after 
EU-enlargement (re- and de-bordering, i.e. policies and practices with regard to e.g. cross-
border co-operation, internal market, migration, security) 
- The research is supported by the Fifth Framework Programme, 2003-2006 
- Is elaborated by a research consortium specialised in borders and border regions 
- The NCBR is responsible for the elaboration of the Supranational Level Studies 
 
This interview is: 
- Semi-structured, i.e. based on, but not tight to, a questionnaire list 
- Supposed to reflect on a number of enlargement issues related to the EU’s external border 
regime 
- Following the core-model of the EXLINEA research framework  
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1c Security 
• What is your estimation and evaluation of illegal East-West migration after EU-
enlargement? 
• Why are border controls necessary? What exactly is “insecure” and “to be protected”? 
• Which measures will be taken against illegal migration? 
• When, in general, can a full implementation of the Schengen acquis be expected? 
 
1d Nationalism and ethnic minorities 
• How do you evaluate tendencies of nationalism (symbols/markers, institutions and 
consequences) in accession countries? 
• How do you evaluate ethnic minority issues in accession countries? 
• What should relationship(s) with non-accession countries be like? 
• What are the attitudes in accession countries towards EU-accession in relation to loss of 
authority, independence and decision-making? 
 
 
2) De-bordering: cross-border co-operation (CBC) 
• What is your estimation and evaluation of political, economic and socio-cultural cross-
border co-operation? 
• Can you name particular examples or flagship developments versus major failures, 
disappointments or frustrations? 
• What is or should be the ultimate goal of CBC in your eyes?  
• What do you think are the determinants of successful CBC? 
• What are the importance and relevance of cross-border region building? 
• Why is there a focus on border regions in integrating political societies and economies? 
• Which strategy is best: “bridge” (active intervention) or “open door” (laissez passer)? 
• What are the relationships between Interreg and Phare? 
 
 
3) Enlargement of the European Union 
• What is your estimation and evaluation of costs versus benefits of EU-enlargement?  
• What makes you think that?  
• What is your estimation and evaluation of the model and process of EU-enlargement?  
 
 
4) The future of the European Union 
• Do you see a paradox or tension between re- and de-bordering trends of the EU (openness 
vs. closure)? 
• How do you evaluate the term EU as a fortress? 
• How do you evaluate the term EU-imperialism? Is the EU making a new East (Golden 
Curtain)? 
• Where will the future external borders of the EU finally be? 
 
 
© NCBR, Henk van Houtum, Olivier Kramsch and Roos Pijpers 
Nijmegen University, the Netherlands 
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ANNEX III: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
 
 
Interviewees DG Enlargement, Estonia team: 
• Mr. Gavriel Avigdor (EMU, statistics, movement of capital, education & training, science 
& research, telecom & IT, culture and audio-visual, taxation, JHA, customs union, CFSP, 
others) 
• Mrs. Susanna May (agriculture, fisheries, external relations, industry, SMEs, budget, 
financial control, institutions, internal market) 
 
 
Interviewee DG Enlargement, Romania team: 
• Mr. Samuel Meunier (transport, environment, energy) 
 
 
Interviewee DG Enlargement, Hungary team: 
• Mrs. Cristina Camaiani (CBC programmes, free movement of capital, EMU, statistics) 
 
 
Interviewees DG Justice and Home Affairs: 
• Mr. Toby King (external borders, accession countries, JHA world-wide) 
• Mrs. Laura Corrado (external borders, Schengen implementation)  
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